MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN

April-
June 1999
PB 34-99-2

Intelligence in the Reserves and National Guard

FROM THE EDITOR

The U.S. Army Reserves and U.S. Army National Guard are critical to the success of the U.S. military. From the Minutemen of the Revolutionary War to the massive Reserve presence in the Gulf War, the United States depends upon its large reserve of citizen soldiers. As we publish this issue of the ***Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin***, more than 30,000 U.S. Reservists are deploying to support U.S. operations in the Balkans. Military Intelligence, like the military at large, depends on the Reserves. In times of peace as well as during crises, MI Reservists fill many positions in the Active Component commands. Furthermore, there are some language and technical skills that **only** MI Reservists can supply. In nearly every watch center, crisis action team, or analysis cell of any theater command, intelligence Reservists are filling critical positions.

Because the Reserve Component (RC) is such an inextricable part of the total force, it is important that we explore new and better ways to fully capture and integrate their capabilities. This issue of ***MIPB*** contains several articles offering new and improved ideas for RC intelligence. Major Jeff Reichman's article on Joint Reserve Units describes how the Reserves provide substantial support to theater commanders, and Sergeant Jim Higday offers several suggestions regarding company unit structure to maximize Reservists' training time.

We are also pleased to publish several other articles updating new initiatives here at the Intelligence Center. Major General John Thomas and Dr. Jim Ellsworth present the new Supervisor Survey Program, and Major Rick Hoehne describes the new Strategic Intelligence Officers Course. Additionally, we have included two Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) force modernization articles: Captain Ken Filer and Chief Warrant Officer Two Ed Moore's article on the Army TENCAP Program and the more specific one by Lieutenant Colonel Randy Spilde and Sharon Carvalho discussing the Tactical Exploitation System.

Often we have more quality articles than we can print in one issue. In an upcoming issue, look for an article entitled "An AC/RC Model Exemplifying the Tactical/Strategic SIGINT Partnership" by Colonel Widmer and Lieutenent Colonel Marsh. Also look for an update on joint intelligence support from the Naval Reserve Intelligence Command.

As always, ***MIPB*** welcomes articles on any topic adding to the professional acumen of the MI Corps. Within the next year, we will publish articles relating to the following topics—

- Noncommissioned officer topics such as training, development, roles, etc.
- Intelligence analysis: strategic, theater, and tactical levels; unconventional warfare scenarios; technical analysis; etc.
- Tactical intelligence.

Writers of the Year and Quarter

MIPB is please to announce the 1998 winners of the Writer of the Year awards. **Writer of the Year**: Captain Chris R. Lindstrom, "A Revolutionary Targeting Concept—The Corps Level Foreward Sensor Enclave," April-June 1998. **Runner up**: Colonel Alfred H. Elliott, III, "Modernization: The Path to Intel XXI and Beyond—The IEW Battlefield Operating System," October-December 1998. **Honorable Mentions**: Major General W. Scott Wallace and Lieutenant Colonel William J. Tait, Jr., "Intelligence in the Division AWE: A Winner for the Next Millennium," April-June 1998; and Sergeant First Class Michael C. Taylor, " The 98C Career Training Strategy," July-September 1998.

Lieutenant Colonel William A. Boik, USAR, and Major Annie H. Spiczak, USAR, are our **Writers of the Quarter**, April-June 1999, for their article "Reserve Component Contributory Support Integration: The INSCOM Way."

Congratulations to all of our winners for 1998 and this quarter, and many thanks to all of the authors for their great articles, book reviews, and letters to the editor. Contributions like yours make ***MIPB*** the professional development forum for MI professionals.

How to Submit an Article to MIPB

MIPB is always seeking good articles on a variety of topics as well as action photographs of MI soldiers. Please see page 56 for more information.

Military Intelligence

PB 34-99-2
Volume 25 Number 2
April-June 1999

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Cover: Special thanks to Major Tey Wiseman for posing for this digitally manipulated cover.

Purpose: The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) publishes the ***Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*** quarterly under provisions of **AR 25-30**. ***MIPB*** disseminates material designed to enhance individuals' knowledge of past, current, and emerging concepts, doctrine, material, training, and professional developments in the MI Corps.

Submissions: Please send your manuscripts, letters to the editor, photographs, and any inquiries to: Commander, USAIC&FH, ATTN: ATZS-CLM, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000; send via E-mail to mipb@huachuca-emh1.army.mil and an information copy to mcgoverne@huachuca-emh1.army.mil; or telephone (520) 538-1006/5 or DSN 879-1006/5.

Subscriptions: Subscription rates are $7.50 per year (Domestic, APO, and FPO) and $9.40 per year (Foreign). Send changes of address and subscriptions (see page 38) to Commander, USAIC&FH, ATZS-CLM, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000. ***Keep us informed of your changes of address!*** For further information, phone (520) 538-1015 or DSN 879-1015 or E-mail martinezc@huachuca-emh1.army.mil.

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05870

VANTAGE POINT

by Major General John D. Thomas, Jr.

The U.S. Army—and the Military Intelligence Corps—is a total force, one composed of the Active Component (AC) Army, the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR), and the U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG). Together with Army civilians and contractors, we are the best ground intelligence organization in the world. A great strength of our Corps is the unique capabilities of our Reserve Component—the RC is critical to performing our mission. Today's global environment and the mission of the U.S. Army make it even more important that we ensure the MI Corps is a seamless force capitalizing on the talents and capabilities of our components. Thirty percent of our Corps is in the RC. We must develop a much closer relationship between the components.

Recent events are encouraging. The 49th Armored Division (Texas ARNG) is preparing to assume the Stabilization Force (SFOR) mission in Bosnia. This mission has allowed us to focus on what is necessary for an ARNG division headquarters to provide intelligence support to a deployed division-level organization. The integration of the 49th Division, 629th MI Battalion (Maryland ARNG), and the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment's 66th MI Company has provided a great opportunity to demonstrate the value of multi-component organizations. With the substantial support of III Corps, Fifth U.S. Army, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), and the Intelligence Center, a Total Force approach is providing focused training and increasing our the effectiveness in multi-component intelligence operations.

The participation of the 28th Infantry Division (Pennsylvania ARNG) in the V Corps Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) Warfighter Exercise is another example of proactive efforts to develop the Total Force team. This exercise gave us an opportunity to work the issues of organizations with different intelligence automation architectures working together. This kind of opportunity allows development of a more flexible and agile intelligence capability within the Army.

Training the RC remains a challenge, but we are making significant progress. The Total Army School System (TASS) Reserve MI battalions are doing superb work. They are first-class professional training organizations that are continually improving their capabilities to deliver quality training in a format tailored to RC requirements. Here at Fort Huachuca, we have

Major General John D. Thomas, Jr.

just begun a significant effort to prepare a distance learning version of the MI Officer Advanced Course (MIOAC). Tailored to the RC, this course will use the latest distance learning technology to provide the MIOAC to unit locations and individual homes around the world. This is our first effort to design a complete course in the distance learning mode; it demonstrates the priority we place on training RC soldiers.

We have made substantial progress toward a seamless force but there is still much to do. Most importantly, we must all strive to understand the contributions and capabilities of our total force and then focus on how best to integrate the components. The total force of the 21st century will be a hybrid force of various organizations—some entirely staffed by one component and many consisting of two or three components. INSCOM has taken the lead by converting the 203d MI Battalion at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland, to a multi-component unit with Active and USAR soldiers working together to accomplish the Army's technical intelligence mission. Establishing multi-component units requires the breaking of

many paradigms in both the AC and RC but it will create a much more capable and flexible force.

I know I can count on you to improve the integration of the Active and Reserve Components. This integration will result in a Military Intelligence Corps ready to face the challenges of the 21st century and to continue our tradition of selfless service to the Army and the nation.

ALWAYS OUT FRONT!

CSM FORUM

by Command Sergeant Major Scott C. Chunn

Congratulations to all the newly selected Sergeants First Class promotable! As we have previously seen with the Sergeant Major and Command Sergeant Major selection lists, and now with the Master Sergeant selection list, promotions are coming back. However, MI is still short 1250 noncommissioned officers—500 at the rank of Sergeant. MI enlisted promotions have dramatically increased in the past few months due to a lack of anticipated Change-in-NCO-Structure (CINCOS) reductions, other structure changes, and immediate Army readiness needs. The recent selections of more than 180 Sergeants First Class to Master Sergeant and the anticipated increased promotions from Staff Sergeant to Sergeant First Class later this year will exacerbate our shortfalls at the Sergeant level.

We currently have 1600 Specialists who are eligible but have not been recommended for promotion. Clearly, even if two-thirds of the eligible Specialists were not ready for the promotion board, we could easily fix our Sergeant shortfall with the remaining one-third. The shortfall of Sergeants will not improve unless we prepare, mentor, counsel, and board our Specialists. We must educate commanders, first sergeants, and supervisors to ensure our soldiers attend the Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC) and get on the promotion list.

I would encourage those Sergeants Major and Command Sergeants Major who have not yet signed on the Sergeant Major and Command Sergeant Major bulletin board to please do so. This is your forum to discuss and resolve issues—we must use it. Connect to the Fort Huachuca home page at http://huachuca-usaic.army.mil and click on the **CSM/SGM BBS** button. Follow the registration instructions and you will receive confirmation of registration within one working day. Your registration will also feed the upcoming Sergeants Major address book which will give you unit assignments and E-mail addresses for all MI Sergeants Major. Again, this is only as good as we make it, so please use it.

This past month, I was fortunate to visit many of the great MI soldiers in the Pacific—in Hawaii, Japan, and Korea. In Hawaii, I visited the 205th MI Battalion, the 703d MI Brigade, the Pacific Joint Intelligence Center (JICPAC), the 125th MI Battalion, and the U.S. Army–Pacific units. In Japan, I visited the 500th MI Group and U.S. Army–Japan, and in Korea I visited the U.S. Forces–Korea units, the 501st MI Brigade, and the 102d MI Battalion. Thanks to those great units for allowing me to visit and making the visits so worthwhile and informative. I am convinced the health of the MI Corps is good and getting better, and that we have the finest soldiers in the Army. We have had some hard times but there is light at the end of the tunnel and I encourage all of you to help make the MI Corps and our Army better than it has ever been. I know you will.

Command Sergeant Major Scott C. Chunn

As always, train hard, take care of soldiers and families, and have fun. Thanks!

ALWAYS OUT FRONT!

USAR MI FORCE REALITY

A Sequel to the Novel And Then There Were None

by Colonel William P. Murray, USAR AGR

The Army revised its response processes over the past ten years to deal with changes in the national military strategy. Threats are less predictable and more diverse resulting from regional instabilities, transnational challenges, and aggressive behavior by rogue states. These rogue states seek power and resources and use the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as a primary means for accomplishing these ends.

The U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) continues its historic emergency support role and is more responsive than ever in supporting the "one Army, one fight" concept. Knowledge of the current planning process and historic trends is critical in understanding the significant reduction in the USAR MI force.

How We Plan

In 1783, when President George Washington recommended the United States base its military primarily on a national militia under Federal supervision, the concept of America's Army Reserve was born. From the beginning, our nation's senior military leadership has continually planned and reacted militarily by turning to its citizen soldiers to reinforce the "regulars" of the active components (AC). In today's environment, the citizen soldier continues to respond.

Over time, the military has defined and refined the process into a distinctively joint planning process. We now divide our planning into two major categories, deliberate and crisis-action planning. **Deliberate planning**, or peacetime planning, builds complete and detailed contingency plans on anticipated or predicted conditions. These plans respond to specific resources identified in joint strategic planning documents. **Crisis-action planning** occurs during unanticipated time-sensitive actions in response to an imminent crisis.

Executing Crisis Plans

Deployment trends over this century reveal a three-fold increase in the past ten years. The Reserves served in repeated crisis-action operations requiring unprecedented deployments. From 1950 to 1989, the Army required fewer than 10 deployments; however, the Army responded to 36 deployments from 1989 to the present. The U.S. Army had 122,000 soldiers assigned to overseas bases during 1998; despite that fact, on an average day last year approximately 28,000 AC and RC soldiers served on temporary duty in more than 70 countries. For example, the USAR has provided more than 70 percent of the U.S. force deployed to Bosnia since 1995. Threat analysis indicates that this trend in crisis-action planning response will continue into the next century.

Congressional Support to the USAR MI Force

Congressional support of the Reserve MI force has been substantial. Through appropriations provided to the Department of Defense (DOD) and executed through the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Joint Reserve Intelligence Connectivity Program (JRICP) initiative equipped 28 sites throughout the United States with state-of-the-art communications.

Each site provides an incredible opportunity for the RC MI forces to contribute worldwide intelligence support to their Services, the theater commanders, and to the combat support agencies (CSAs). The USAR MI soldier now has the resources to permit access to the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) and other communications capabilities. Connectivity coupled with new and additional Reserve intelligence funding programs provide both the AC commands and CSAs with extensive yet remote USAR MI soldiers supporting from distant operating locations in the Continental United States.

Intelligence Contributory Support

The DOD has provided additional and significant funding for intelligence contributory support (ICS). ICS provides a well-funded capability for soldiers to deploy on active duty for varying periods in support of validated intelligence requirements. The value-added nature of ICS in training, readiness, and retention is well documented and growing significantly. A review of USAR MI support in fiscal year 1997 (FY97) indicated that the USAR MI force provided more than the equivalent of three AC battal-



Figure 1. USAR MI Reductions 1991 through 2000.

ions to support Army intelligence requirements.

With the 28 new connectivity sites located throughout the country, significant changes quickly occurred in the capability of the MI Reservist to provide intelligence support. Army MI soldiers can provide assistance from multiple operational locations in the continental United States across the operational continuum to support—

- Theater and functional commands.
- CSAs.
- Corps.
- Component commanders.
- The Army Staff.
- U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM).

The Army Reserve Intelligence Support Centers (ARISCs) quickly evolved to premier connectivity and production sites. Success in engaging the ARISCs in peacetime contributions through the JRICP has been overwhelming. The five existing ARISC facilities were already firmly established secure compartmented information facilities (SCIFs) with an assigned and experienced training cadre, administrators, and a capability for seven-days-a-week operation. They smoothly expanded their capabilities to simultaneously engage in peacetime training and intelligence support while still providing the doctrinal capability for virtual linking of sanctuary and split-based operations. In two years, the ARISCs quickly became the focus of multi-Service RC intelligence use. Currently, USAR MI soldiers' usage represents only about one-third of the facilities' use.

In 1998, the USAR MI soldiers provided intelligence support (split-based or on-site) to seven theater commander in chief (CINC) joint intelligence operations, four U.S. Army Component commands, three CSAs, three U.S. Army Corps, and twelve INSCOM subordinate commands. This additive "real world" intelligence mission support provides significant value-added to each of the organizations. In some cases, RC support includes assuming theater production responsibilities for a CINC's joint intelligence operations when the in-theater intelligence center has to focus on a crisis situation for an extended period of time. This dramatic expansion in both crisis-action and peacetime contributory support demonstrates the geometric increase of the USAR MI support.

The USAR MI Oxymoron

While the USAR MI requests for support increase, the Army counters them with unabated reductions. The Army has reduced its strength by about one-third. The USAR MI strength reductions are in excess of 64 percent (see Figure 1.) By the end of FY99, the USAR MI force will represent less

than 1.5 percent of the USAR. We can expect significantly more cuts in the ongoing Total Army Analysis 07 (TAA-07) process.

Why the Incongruity?

Studies including the MI Force Design Update (FDU) initiatives in the early of 1990s resulted in a restructure the USAR MI force. The initiatives were highly innovative and incorporated many of the lessons learned from deployments during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and earlier DOD Inspector General findings. The focus of the Reserve MI force shifted from equipment-heavy battalions supporting RC combat forces at division and brigade level to modular teams focusing on providing MI skills for AC units at the corps and echelons above corps (EAC) levels.

The most significant change was to retool the entire USAR MI force to link a new modular structure (team-level plugs) with anticipated combat commanders' requirements. Configured with their own unit identification codes (UICs), the modular teams could mobilize individually to support any shortfall or expansion requirement at the corps or force projection brigade. In theory, the commanders' could plug USAR MI teams into their intelligence structures without having to mobilize companies or parent battalions. Theoretically, the corps or EAC unit has great flexibility to tailor its intelligence force.

MI Force Reality

In reality, the 1995 restructuring has proven disastrous for the MI community and in particular for the USAR MI soldiers. Simply yet painfully stated, identification of the **operational plan (OPLAN) requirements** for the 1995 restructure has been slow; there is **no solid published doctrine** for the restructured MI table of organization and equipment (TOE) force. From an OPLAN perspective and a force programming perspective, without a documented Army-supported WARTRACE[1] and solidly approved doctrine, there is little justification for MI in the Reserve force. Anticipated deliberate planning requirements to support both OPLAN provisions and WARTRACE program development for modular teams have not wound their way through the multi-year OPLAN review sequences required by the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System. Neither has anyone published doctrine that codifies the modular structure. Four years after the formal Vice Chief of Staff of the Army decision to build a modular USAR MI force, only four modularized structures (two battalions and two companies) have a formal planning association or WARTRACE alignment.

A Victim of Success Looking for Doctrine

In many ways, USAR MI is a victim of its own success. Connectivity and technology (provided by the JRICP coupled with substantial funding for intelligence contributory support) provide AC organizations with a nearly cost-free emergency MI capability. An older axiom seems to apply—why buy the cow if the milk is free? Continual contributory and crisis-action intelligence support neither documents nor validates OPLAN (WARTRACE) requirements nor do they count for substantiating Army MI doctrine. For whatever reason, no one has invested the time and effort required to document the doctrine using the modular structure, or to build and staff OPLANs using this structure.

The Bottom Line

The reality is that the USAR MI structure has proven to be a reliable and effective emergency force. However, the force can only continue to exist if it earns validation to support deliberate planning requirements generated by the combat commanders. In tandem, approved doctrine provides the framework and principles of how intelligence supports the commander in his planning process. Unless we establish doctrine and properly document the USAR MI force in the deliberate planning process, the continued viability of USAR MI is at risk and its structure will assuredly receive additional and significant cuts. Failure to respond to these issues will have two results: additional USAR reductions will be at the expense of Reserve MI spaces and faces, and there will soon be no answer to the ever increasing emergency calls.✷

Endnote

1. "WARTRACE" in simple terms is a planning association of an RC unit with the organization with which it would go to war or to which it would be subordinate. It is somewhat dated but still used to describe associations ranging from training to actual war plans.

Colonel Bill Murray is currently serving in an Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) assignment as the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT). His previous AGR assignments include Reserve Affairs Provost Marshall for U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM) and on a detail to a multinational force; Chief, Military Police (MP) Desk, U.S. Army Reserve Personnel Center; Unit and Personnel Readiness Officer, DCSINT, USARC; and Intelligence Staff Officer, J2, Headquarters FORSCOM. Prior to his AGR selection, he commanded the 386th MP Detachment and the 323d MI Detachment. He is a graduate of the MP and MI Officer Advanced Courses, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Reserve Officers Course at the NATO Defense College, and the Army War College. He holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science from the University of Alabama where he earned his Reserve Officer Training Corps commission; he also has a Master of Arts degree in Administration from Central Michigan University. Readers may contact the author via E-mail at murraywi@usarc-emh2.army.mil and telephonically at (404) 464-8422 or DSN 367-8422.

ARISCs
Regional RC Intelligence Training Centers

by Major Eric L. Lamberson

The Army's downsizing begun during the mid-1990s has caused the Army Reserve's contributions to intelligence to be more important than ever. Congress recognized the critical role that Reserve MI soldiers play in supporting Army operations when it funded the creation of Army Reserve Intelligence Support Centers (ARISCs) in 1996.

The ARISCs resulted from an evolutionary process begun in 1981 when the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) established centralized training facilities (CTFs) for "hard-skill" intelligence training. The CTFs provided facilities and personnel to support training that Reserve units could not conduct locally. The requirement for a central training facility stemmed from the fact that Reserve Component (RC) MI units were typically where there was a Reservist population to support the unit's manpower requirements. However, these widely scattered units did not have the resources or the facilities to conduct quality MI training since it requires access to secure facilities, intelligence systems, and subject matter experts. Because these capabilities are expensive to build and maintain, it was not feasible to provide every Reserve MI unit with its own MI training facility. Instead, the Army brought Reservists to the CTFs several times a year to maintain their MI skills. By 1986, the CTFs became the Regional Training Sites—Intelligence (RTS-Is) with a battle-focused collective training emphasis.

In 1996, because of the Department of Defense (DOD) plan to increase Reserve intelligence training focus upon real-world operations, Major General Baratz (the Army Reserve Commander) designated the RTS-Is as Army Reserve Intelligence Support Centers or ARISCs. The new ARISCs received significant increases in jointly funded intelligence systems and connectivity and became part of the 28-site Joint Reserve Intelligence Connectivity Program (JRICP).

Joint Reserve Intelligence Connectivity Program

The 28 JRICP sites were Service-owned intelligence training or production facilities already in existence. They included U.S. Army Reserve (USAR), U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG), Air National Guard, and Naval Reserve intelligence sites as well as some active component (AC) locations (such as Fort Lewis, Washington). These sites are typically located near concentrations of RC intelligence personnel from all the Services. While the original military Service or component still "owns" the JRICP sites, they are available to all qualified RC intelligence personnel, regardless of Service.

The JRIC Program sites are Congressionally funded locations where the DOD provides several million dollars worth of communications connectivity and state-of-the-art intelligence systems. The Congress's intent in mandating the JRICs was to enable the DOD to provide quality training for Reserve intelligence personnel while providing the military opportunities to use Reserve intelligence talent to satisfy unfulfilled national intelligence requirements.

The ARISCs are the "flagship" JRICP sites because they generally have larger facilities and, more importantly, full-time staffs of qualified intelligence professionals and trainers. Most other JRICP sites only have a handful of administrative and systems administration personnel.

ARISCs support sister Service RC intelligence production through the shared use of facilities and remote connectivity. Although still technically "Army" organizations, the ARISCs rely on joint funding and programs for much of their considerable capabilities. While this works to the Army's advantage, it does require that ARISC planners consider joint requirements and guidance.

Current Structure

There are five ARISCs within the Army Reserves (see Figure 1). The ARISCs are a direct extension of the Headquarters, U.S. Army Reserve Command, and report directly through the USARC Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT, currently Colonel William P. Murray). The ARISCs conduct or support MI-specific training for RC MI units and personnel. ARISCs are not military occupational specialty- (MOS) or additional skill-producing schools, but rather they support individual and collective sustainment-training requirements. The ARISCs' primary focus is on improving Army RC MI unit readiness with a sec-

Figure courtesy of the North Central ARISC



Figure 1. ARISC Sites.

ondary focus of supporting ARNG and sister Service MI unit readiness. Beyond the actual facilities, each ARISC has the regional responsibility to provide special security office support to all USAR MI and other RC intelligence units and personnel within its geographic region, as appropriate.

Training Capabilities

ARISC training covers a complete spectrum of MI training requirements at all levels—from tactical through strategic. The ARISCs can perform sustainment training for MI technical skills to basic individual MOSs or small teams, foreign language sustainment training, intelligence systems and database training, and formal systems-security courses. In addition to individually focused training, ARISCs can support or conduct exercises for MI units and personnel as well as MI LANE[1] unit evaluations. MI reserve units undergoing mobilization can look to the ARISCs for specific training related to the units' active missions, including force protection and area briefings.

The MI units and individual soldiers taking advantage of ARISC training capabilities are often heavily involved in real-world intelligence production. One ARISC training focus involves contributory support or mission-oriented training. In this context, contributory support is USAR MI units or soldiers working to satisfy AC Unified Commands, other joint commands, major commands, corps, or national-level agency intelligence requirements. This approach uses real-world targets or data and often supports WARTRACE[2] or the gaining commands relationship, Unified Command commanders in chief (CINCs), other combat commands, or national agencies' intelligence requirements. Most RC MI units prefer this method because it provides the most realistic environment while simultaneously supporting real-world requirements. In addition, live mission training also maintains the interest of the units and soldiers involved.

Ideally, all RC MI units and personnel will have a WARTRACE or some other close relationship with an AC gaining command that provides them with a mission focus. Where that does not exist, the ARISCs develop an appropriate mission focus that not only satisfies unfulfilled CINC or national requirements but also supports the units' mission essential task lists (METLs). ARISCs can readily func-



Figure 2. ARISC RC Customer Support.

tion as a "sanctuary" during split-based operations and support ongoing missions and deployments anywhere in the world from their locations. For example, the Southwest and the North Central ARISCs are conducting remote missions supporting U.S. forces deployed in Europe.

Unique Capabilities

Each ARISC has unique capabilities or areas of excellence that result from their personnel mix, the units they support, special equipment, or geographic locations. For example, the Southwest (SW) ARISC is a leader in signals intelligence (SIGINT). The SW ARISC is near several major AC SIGINT organizations (such as the Medina Regional Security Operations Center) and their supported units have high linguist populations. The SW ARISC is the only USAR site with access to the National Security Agency's NSA Net (a SIGINT-specific secure network), and it is the first of many sites to be part of the National Security Agency's Virtual Team project. This effort provides remote support to deployed U.S. forces.

The Southeast (SE) ARISC leads the Army Reserve's All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) training program. The SE ARISC has an ASAS-Extended (Block I) system and expects Block II upgrades in the near future. The SE ARISC has developed ASAS skill-sustainment training programs for USAR and ARNG units and has the ability to conduct two types of ASAS training. They present two-week workshops for Active, Reserve, and National Guard MI units that focus on the customers' specific ASAS Enclave training requirements. In addition, the SE ARISC can deploy ASAS mobile training teams (MTTs) to train MI Reserve units during field training exercises.

Although the SE ARISC is the only site to have a complete ASAS, the other ARISCs have ASAS remote workstations (RWSs) that will ultimately connect to other sites via the SIPRNET (Secure Internet Protocol Router Network). In addition, thirty major MI Reserve are receiving Warlord Notebook computers for training purposes.

The North Central (NC) ARISC is the joint intelligence center (JIC) prototype and the only ARISC that focuses its contributory support efforts almost exclusively on a joint command. The NC ARISC supports the Joint Analysis Center (JAC) in Molesworth, England, and has the highest real-world production rate of any ARISC. The NC ARISC is focusing its planning and training efforts on its readiness to begin surge support to the JAC Molesworth and the National Ground In-

telligence Center as the Kosovo crisis continues.

The Western (W) ARISC focuses its efforts on providing imagery support to the U.S. Pacific Command's (PACOM) JIC. The W ARISC is conducting second-phase imagery exploitation supporting PACOM requirements. It is also involved in the Counter-proliferation Analysis and Planning System, a Joint Staff initiative with the Department of Energy and Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. This initiative takes advantage of the W ARISC's high-speed communications network to distribute counter-proliferation analysis products to the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, regional CINCs, and other intelligence community organizations.

The focus of the Northeast (NE) ARISC its efforts on counterintelligence, interrogation, and imagery-exploitation training. The NE ARISC has supported a variety of Active and Reserve unit exercises and often provides the controllers and role players for the United States and European countries.

Training Limitations

Surge periods will severely stress the ARISC staff's time and capabilities, particularly if they must train MOSs or language skills that have low population densities. While capable of sending out MTTs, most ARISCs are essentially fixed-site operations. MI training without the ARISC facility's sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF) and connectivity generally limits some of the ARISCs' ability to perform mobile training. On the tactical side, the lack of MTOE (modified table of organization and equipment) equipment necessitates the inconvenience of borrowing equipment, but it is not a complete MTT "show stopper."

The availability and "intelligence skill set" of USAR and other RC MI personnel ultimately determine the ARISC's ability to perform real-world mission support. This is something over which the ARISCs have little control.

Keeping up with technological changes is a major challenge for the ARISCs. The ARISC must identify their customers' technological requirements and then acquire the equipment, connectivity, and staff expertise necessary to fulfill these requirements. Often this is not something that the ARISC can do without extensive planning and lead-time.

Focus on the Future

The ARISCs are also planning for their roles in Army XXI and several efforts are underway to develop information operations (IO) capabilities within the Reserve force. The SW ARISC is a leader in IO experimentation due to its proximity to the Joint Command and Control Warfare Center (JC^2WC) and a population of Reservists involved in the San Antonio-Austin high-technology industry. It will be the Reserve's first information operations focus center (IOC). This is a high-priority program designed for two purposes: to provide some RC personnel augmentation to the Land Information Warfare Center (LIWA) (the Army's information operations agency) and to tap the Reservists' civilian job-acquired skills to work IO requirements. Geared to command and control (C^2) Protect, this program protects the Army's information infrastructure.

The Army Reserve IO program calls for direct RC augmentation of the LIWA staff, a full-time control cell, Reserve IO Focus Centers located near civilian high-technology activity, and USAR connectivity. The USARC will locate the centers at Fort Devens (near the Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Fort Belvoir, Virginia (near Washington, D.C.), and Camp Bullis, Texas (in San Antonio near the JC^2WC). The USARC has proposed a fourth IOC for the Western ARISC in Dublin, California, near the high-technology area of the Silicon Valley.

The Reserve IO Centers will have three sections: the technical research section, the computer-emergency response team (CERT), and the Information Infrastructure-Defense Assessment Team. The technical research section will establish a battle lab to test and determine the impact of various patches, fixes, or problems on Army information processing networks. The CERT will augment the primary Army CERT at LIWA. However, the SW ARISC CERT will cover networks in the Southern Texas area and conduct trend analysis of computer incidents nationwide. The Information Infrastructure-Defense Assessment Team will train network administrators and conduct preventative assessments of Army network vulnerabilities.

Conclusion

The ARISC system provides MI units and soldiers in the U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard with current training instruction and state-of-the-art facilities and MI systems. However, they also provide a real-world intelligence support and production capability that will become increasingly more important as the Army and DOD move into the 21st century.*

Special thanks to Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Carl L. Chappell, Jr., the SW ARISC Commander, for his assistance in reviewing and commenting upon this article. Both LTC Carol J. Rogers (NC ARISC Commander) and LTC Richard M. Thevel (SE ARISC Commander) also provided valuable input.

Endnotes

1. The MI "LANE" is the Army Reserve effort to examine a Reserve unit's ability to perform its METL or wartime missions. "LANE" is the Reserve version of the AC's Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP).

Joint Reserve Units Supporting the Commander

by Major Jeffery S. Reichman

The 0700 production briefing at Regional Production Center (RPC)-Denver has all the focus and intensity of any daily brief at a joint task force. As it should. The responsibility of the RPC-Denver—supporting more than 200 Reserve intelligence personnel and the gaining command—is serious indeed. So starts another production weekend for Detachments 4 and 6 of RPC-Denver located at Buckley Air National Guard Base (ANGB).

The Army Reservists assigned to RPC-Denver are part of a new Department of Defense (DOD) initiative called the Joint Reserve Intelligence Program (JRIP). In January 1995, DOD created a plan to use its Reserve intelligence elements more fully in support of peacetime intelligence requirements. The plan is based on budgetary realities of the post-Cold War era: DOD could no longer afford its traditional division of labor between the Active and Reserve Components.

DOD had traditionally assigned the peacetime mission of training to Reservists, but defense intelligence, composed of 40-percent uniformed reservists, had to perform its mission whether or not Reservists were training on a given day. It was imperative to use Reserve intelligence elements as well as active ones in support of all requirements—whether peacetime, crises, or war.[1]

In short, DOD could no longer afford to predominately assign to the Reserves the peacetime mission of training without engagement. Nor could the Reserves ignore the significant training benefits to be derived from doing in peacetime what you will in war. For defense intelligence, which is always active, it was imperative to use all intelligence resources in support of peacetime, crises, contingency, or wartime requirements.[2]

The result was the creation of 28 Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers (JRICs) established nationwide. The JRICs are softcopy production and communications sites with advanced intelligence production computers and capabilities. These JRICs are electronically connected to the DOD intelligence network through the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System (JWICS). Each of these JRICs is staffed by part-time Reservists producing full-time intelligence for the Unified Combat Commands, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), and the Services' intelligence agencies. During peacetime, Reserve intelligence units support stability operations, sustainment operations, and support operations such as those in Bosnia and Haiti.

The JRICs are revolutionary. Instead of a part-time force that must mobilize for war or major contingencies, the JRICs allow Reservists more flexible employment. Now reservists can be regarded as a full-time equivalent force, adjusted daily—even hourly—to meet the operational tempo (OPTEMPO) needs of the supported command or organization. When increased OPTEMPO at the supported command produces a work surge at the JRIC, Reservists simply continue doing what they were doing during training periods, only with greater intensity.

Joint Reserve Units—RPC-Denver

In 1996, the Chief, U.S. Army Reserve, committed to support the JRIC plan by developing 15 augmentation detachments, or JRUs as they are known, at Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) and commander in chief (CINC) levels. Two of these units are at Buckley ANGB, which is the Headquarters for RPC-Denver: one of the 28 JRICs. RPC-Denver is a fully integrated and accessible intelligence force consisting of Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine personnel providing intelligence support to the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC), U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM).

Pacific Command, located at Fort Smith, Hawaii, has the overall mission to promote peace, deter ag-

gression, respond to crises and, if necessary, fight and win to advance both security and stability throughout the Asia-Pacific region. The PACOM area of responsibility (AOR) stretches from California to India and the eastern shore of Africa, encompassing 43 nations. This region includes more than half the world's surface, half its population, and (when combined with the United States) half its economy. PACOM's intelligence support is provided by the JIC whose mission it is to analyze, produce, and disseminate accurate and timely all-source, fused intelligence to PACOM component and the sub-unified commanders, and their operating forces.

Mission

Army Reserve MI soldiers assigned to Detachments 4 and 6 have the production support mission of maintaining order of battle (OB) records contained within the Integrated Database (IDB)/Military Integrated Database (MIDB). This production is indispensable to the commander, and tasked directly by the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Command (JICPAC).

The IDB is the DOD standardized integrated intelligence system that supports general MI production and provides general military intelligence (GMI) to the commander. The MIDB is replacing the IDB as the GMI database for the Distributed Production Program (DPP) to provide this data to the combat commander. The MIDB will serve as the primary repository of intelligence data for the entire U.S. DOD community, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The MIDB OB data contains all valid textual and graphical products (military forces, installations and facilities, population concentrations, command and control (C^2) structures, significant events, and equipment) for retrieval and maintenance.

Collecting

The Army Reservists assigned to RPC-Denver have access to a wide range of resources including imagery reporting databases, INTELINK (Intelligence Link), OILSTOCK (a graphic mapping system), classified hardcopy reports or publications, and unclassified open-source materials. These systems provide us the same production tools (computer hardware and software) as our gaining command, PACOM; and allows the JRU to work in an entirely different and more efficient way (softcopy) instead of using the traditional hardcopy production process involving weeks or months of delays.

INTELINK is one of our most valuable tools. The INTELINK network provides Army Reservists with information from the classified databases of various intelligence agencies (e.g., DIA, Central Intelligence Agency, NIMA, National Ground Intelligence Center, and the National Reconnaissance Office). INTELINK is similar in its appearance and functions to the worldwide web. With INTELINK, RPC-Denver soldiers also have access to SAFE (Support for the Analysis File Environment), which is an electronic cable processing system providing us with an all-source traffic retrieval system.

Processing

To process, analyze, and evaluate our information, RPC-Denver Reservists use the OILSTOCK and Multi-Source Automatic Target Recognition Exploitation (MATRIX) systems. OILSTOCK provides us with the capacity to present and manipulate information in a geographical context. Our analysts are able to select desired intelligence from signals intelligence (SIGINT) sources and view the data elements in textual and graphic forms. Thus, we can model the intelligence collection systems against JICPAC requirements, and then display the geographically required location data. MATRIX is an electronic light-table software package also used to exploit imagery.

Dissemination

Finished products and database updates arrive at JICPAC via our JRU Web Page. The products have a homepage appearance and functions, including point-and-click features that allow our end-user (JICPAC) to move around the package with ease. JICPAC can also download and print individual sections of the products as needed. The homepage-type format also permits analysts to link supporting products, such as previous studies, to the product. Products can also be sent (via file transfer protocol or E-mail) to JICPAC for publication and further processing as needed.

The Army Reserve JRU program concept is an exceptional program providing Army Reserve intelligence personnel with a real-world mission. As a result, the JRU element (RPC-Denver) is becoming better prepared to respond to the changing world situation and to refocus Reserve intelligence collection, analysis, and production as needed while continuing to meet the intelligence needs of our operation forces in the Pacific. ✷

Endnotes

1. Lee, Deborah R., *The Joint Reserve Intelligence Program: Providing the Value of an Integrated Total Force*, National Security Report, April 1998.

2. "Shaping Our Future in the Asia-Pacific," ***Joint Forces Quarterly***, Autumn/Winter 1997-98.

Major Jeff Reichman is currently the Deputy Officer in Charge—Red Team, RPC-Denver. He has served as the S2 1-29 Field Artillery Battalion, Ground Surveillance Platoon Leader; and S4 104th MI Battalion; Senior Intellligence and Opposing Force Officer, 1st Maneuver Training Center; Imagery Analyst, U.S. Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base; and Intelligence Observer/Controller, 1st Brigade 91st Division (Opposing Foce). He has a Bachelor of Science degree in Geophysics from Bowling Green State University. Readers can contact him via E-mail at jsreichman@marathonoil.com telephonically at (303) 347-5609.

Reserve Component Contributory Support Integration: The INSCOM Way

by Lieutenant Colonel William A. Boik, USAR, and Major Annie H. Spiczak, USAR

The heart of AC/RC integration is the creation of an ability for commanders to seize every opportunity to support intelligence requirements by fully utilizing every skilled intelligence professional available whether they be in the Active or Reserve Component.

Recent military operations have highlighted the increased U.S. Army reliance on a fully integrated Active and Reserve force in providing timely multidiscipline intelligence in support of the total force. To be successful in the 21st century, all Army units must break the old mind-set of Active Component (AC) or Reserve Component (RC) military operations. They must develop a new paradigm of an expanded and fully integrated AC or RC partnership.

The U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), as the Army's echelons above corps (EAC) MI force with worldwide responsibilities and requirements, has aggressively developed a program of expanded AC/RC partnership and a "train as we fight" relationship for the total MI force. The Command has been at the cutting edge of AC/RC integration over the past few years by providing the resources and expertise necessary to enable RC MI units to provide intelligence support to on-going INSCOM missions from their home stations. It has also invested heavily in automation and communications connectivity for a number of RC EAC MI units and has begun planning for the restructuring of several EAC MI units as multi-component (AC/RC) units. All of these actions are laying the foundation for an aggressive AC/RC partnership as we move into the 21st century.

This article will briefly describe the approach that INSCOM is taking to ensure a fully integrated intelligence force capable of supporting all customers as we enter the next century. See Figure 1 for a graphic depiction of the RC MI vision.

Background

The INSCOM staff realized in the early 1990s that as resources continued to decline, it was essential that all intelligence elements (both AC and RC) function as an integrated team. The RC EAC MI force brought with it numerous capabilities—whether mobilized, operating from home stations, or operating from INSCOM locations. These capabilities both complemented INSCOM's ability and enhanced the Command's ability to effectively conduct future intelligence operations and support the force. INSCOM's ability to maximize the use of these capabilities will significantly affect its ability to support the Army XXI soldier.

Within INSCOM, the Reserve MI force fulfills six roles. These include:

- Backfilling INSCOM units during mobilization and deployment.
- Rounding out INSCOM units during contingency operations and regional conflicts.
- Providing regional subject matter expertise not available within the INSCOM units.
- Furnishing tailored intelligence products for national, strategic, operational, and tactical commanders.
- Supplying intelligence support for deployed INSCOM units.
- Contributing unique language capabilities and expertise, especially in low-density languages not readily available within the AC.

The RC supports INSCOM and its customers through tailored RC MI force packages, individual Reservists, or RC training and intelligence centers, such as the Army Reserve Intelligence Support Centers (ARISCs) and the Utah Army National Guard facilities near Salt Lake City, Utah. In fiscal year 1999, the Army RC EAC MI force consists of more than 2200 Reservists in a variety of MI troop units; these include counterintelligence (CI), technical intelligence



Figure 1. Reserve Component Vision.

(TECHINT), interrogation, production, and imagery intelligence (IMINT). Roughly 2100 National Guard members serve in linguist units. Additionally, there are approximately 300 Reserve individual mobilization augmentees (IMAs) directly assigned to the various INSCOM major subordinate commands (MSCs). Figure 2 depicts RC MI integration.

The full integration of these elements into INSCOM operations will produce a number of benefits for both the Command and our customers. These include:

- Improved response time and the ability to surge during crisis requirements.
- Additional resources to meet increasing intelligence requirements.
- Ability to leverage the unique civilian, military, and language skills and expertise of Reserve intelligence personnel to satisfy critical requirements that would otherwise remain unmet.
- Ability to maintain and hone skills needed by Reserve intelligence personnel through the conduct of peacetime, real-world intelligence operations.

Development of an Integrated Program for RC Support

Over the years, INSCOM has relied on RC support for a number of critical on-going mission requirements. However, most of this support was unplanned and accomplished sporadically. The initial step taken by the Command was to establish a comprehensive, integrated, and fully coordinated program for RC contributory support. To do this, INSCOM published its first RC Support and Integration Plan (RCSIP) in 1996. Through the RCSIP, the Command ensures that each of its MSCs develops a program fully integrating the RC EAC MI resources (both units and personnel) into INSCOM operations to the maximum extent possible.

Four important principles guided the initial development of the INSCOM RCSIP and continue to guide INSCOM planning today:



Figure 2. RC MI Integration.

- Maximum leveraging of RC capabilities and resources whenever possible to assist in the accomplishment of on-going peacetime requirements.
- Bringing the real-world missions to the Reservists.
- Habitual AC/RC relationships for both peacetime and crisis or contingency operations.
- Full automation and communications connectivity between AC and RC EAC MI units.

The RCSIP serves as a guide for the INSCOM Headquarters staff and its MSCs in the development of plans and procedures for usage of RC EAC MI resources. It outlines the responsibilities, planning considerations, coordination procedures, current RC EAC MI units and their capabilities, and resource availability and programming requirements.

Implementation of an Integrated Program for RC Support

To ensure the implementation of consistent and effective approaches throughout the command, INSCOM initiated two interrelated actions. The first of these was a periodic RC Support and Integration Workshop and In-Progress Review (IPR). Participants include all MSC S3s and RC integration coordinators, as well as representatives from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency, U.S. Army Reserve Command, and aligned RC MI units. It provides the attendees with an opportunity to share ideas for effective AC/RC integration, discuss issues, and reinforce the commanding general's guidance.

Major General John D. Thomas, Jr., (then the INSCOM Commander) opened the Conference by emphasizing the importance of RC support to INSCOM. He stated, *"given the requirements, RC contributory support is not an option...(it) is critical to our success and we will make it happen."* Reinforcing his commitment to AC/RC integration, MG Thomas emphasized that the unit commanders and S3s played a critical role in implementing the INSCOM RCSIP and he told attendees that he expected their full support.

As part of the conference, attendees were briefed on the AC/RC seamless partnership concept, future RC force structure planning and received an update on the Individual Mobilization Augmentee Program. Additionally, the MSCs provided a brief overview of their initial RC support and integration planning; they adressed any issues they had related to AC/RC integration. These briefings provided a unique opportunity for attendees to share ideas, identify challenges, propose solutions, and develop implementation milestones.

The second action was the establishment of a Reserve Affairs Staff Inspection and Assistance Program as part of the overall Command Inspection Program. Under this program, personnel from the Reserve Affairs staff periodically visit INSCOM's subordinate units and inspect the units' RC integration programs. The inspection covers five essential aspects of a successful AC/RC integration program: integration planning, WARTRACE[1] alignments, training association program, IMA Program, and integration execution. There is a detailed checklist for each aspect and the inspectors rate units "go" or "no go" in each area based on the level of their integration planning and execution.

RC Integration Success Stories

During 1998, RC soldiers provided more than 2955 workdays of contributory support to the intelligence mission of INSCOM and its MSCs. This was in addition to the normal two-week annual training (AT) and inactive duty training (IDT) of the command's IMA (DIMA) soldiers. These contributory support successes cross all areas of INSCOM's normal peacetime and contingency support operations. Some of those that stand out include the following:

- Development and production of critical intelligence products in support of operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
- Development and production of important intelligence products on several rogue states.
- Translation of open-source data in support of an on-going computer espionage investigation.
- Installation, debugging, and evaluation of a network intrusion detection (NID) system.
- Preparation of daily operational situation reports in support of Operation JOINT GUARD.
- Augmentation of the 24-hour watch operations center in Europe enabling the conduct of surge operations in support of Operation JOINT GUARD.
- Monitoring of the threat warning system that to provides warning to U.S. and Coalition forces engaged in Operation JOINT GUARD.

Conclusion

These successes represent INSCOM's commitment to a fully integrated AC/RC MI Force. With declining resources, the AC/RC partnership will clearly enhance INSCOM's ability to maximize the use of the Command's total capabilities and significantly impact on its ability to support the Army XXI soldier. As we move into the 21st century, INSCOM will continue to pursue the full integration of the RC EAC MI force. This includes all areas of operations, seizing opportunities to support intelligence requirements by fully using every skilled Army intelligence professional available. ✷

Endnote

1. "WARTRACE" in simple terms is a planning association of an RC unit with the organization with which it would go to war or to which it would be subordinate. It is somewhat dated but still used to describe associations ranging from training to actual war plans.

The authors would like to thank Colonel Richard T. Dunbar (USAR, Retired), former U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) Deputy Chief of Staff, Reserve Affairs, for his assistance in reviewing and updating this article.

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Military Intelligence in the Army National Guard:

Poised for the 21st Century?

by Major Timothy W. Keasling, ARNG AGR

The U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG) is positioning itself within the military intelligence community in the areas of training, organization, equipment, and operations so that it will have relevance in the Total Force. In the area of training, the National Guard Bureau will need to work with the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca to produce an "ASAS- (All-Source Analysis System) proficient" soldier. This will provide the foundation on which to build our modified ASAS architectures that will enhance our combat ready units.

Photos courtesy of author.

The 28th Infantry Division redeploys home after a successful deployment.

ARNG MI Challenges

ASAS-proficient soldiers will possess perishable intelligence automation skills. We must provide a way for our soldiers to obtain and maintain the skills they need to perform when called to do so.

We also face another challenge as the Active Component (AC) becomes highly automated with ASAS variants. It will become more challenging for the ARNG units to have connectivity with the AC as they train and to perform mission support. We are currently laying the foundation for connectivity with the development of the MI Cadre Battalions in the divisions (see pages 28 and 57) and direct support MI companies in the ARNG separate infantry brigades (eSBs). The problem with these organizations is that their modified tables of organization and equipment reflect antiquated, non-automated force structure models. It is difficult to organize for the 21st century when you are developing units using out-of-date structures. We will correct this with time but we first need to organize ourselves effectively.

Another problem with both the AC and ARNG unit structure is that there is no allowance for an automation support cell. This cell would have two or more soldiers whose primary job will be keeping the automation system going (in limited scope) and becoming the master trainers in garrison during periods of inactive duty training (IDT). The AC uses contracted civilians and cross-trained soldiers to keep the systems running. The ARNG cannot afford long-term contracting. Furthermore, having this sup-

Sergeant Major James R. Mulkey taking a situation report during deployment to USAREUR.

port cell will cause master trainers at unit level to focus training during IDTs. This idea is similar to what combat arms units have been doing for several years with their master gunner program and Aviation with their standardization program. Standardization is critical because the cell would provide the continuity between IDTs and heighten the soldiers' proficiency. Maintaining proficiency is a very hard task for the AC, and it is a monumental one for us in the ARNG. By organizing efficiently, we can maximize our resources and training time.

All the organizing in the world will not matter if we do not have the equipment to use in training. The situation we face today is similar to what the U.S. Army faced before World War II. Armor units were using regular cars and trucks to simulate armored vehicles. As the Assistant G2 for the 38th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Indiana Army National Guard, I found myself doing the same thing. We organized the G2 section and the 138th Cadre MI Battalion into an Analysis and Control Element (ACE) and then told our soldiers to simulate what our connectivity would be. Quality soldiers need challenges in learning the automation tools of their trade.

How can we obtain the equipment that we need to train our soldiers to be interchangeable with their AC counterparts? One possible solution is for the ARNG divisions and eSBs to purchase their own Warlord Notebook (WLNB) equipment for training or to make use of Reserve Component (RC)/AC integration to help procure the necessary training equipment. This equipment should serve as a training tool for the interim until recognition of the requirement in the Material Requirements Document. The MRD states the Army acquisition objective, determines the Total Army requirement, and addresses the problem of automating the ARNG MI units. The coordination to have the requirement placed in the MRD is lengthy and as yet unfinished.

A Solution

One solution is taking advantage of RC/AC integration. What does this mean? In the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR). Each year we deploy more than 10,000 ARNG soldiers into USAREUR to support the AC. Missions vary from the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) opposing forces (OPFOR) rotations to transmission repair at the Kaiserslautern Industry Complex (KIC). They move in an overseas deployment for training (ODT) status. Each time a unit comes to USAREUR for ODT, they perform mission essential task list (METL) training.

Because we provide support to the AC, we are able to turn the support we give them into additional training for ourselves. This year, we are bringing more ARNG MI soldiers into the Eurpoean theater to train. Our MI ODT soldiers currently support U.S. Army Europe USAREUR exercises. They are able to work with USAREUR equipment and train in a doctrinal ACE in a live environment. Each time a unit deploys to support an exercise or contingency, they participate in a good training environment as well. A good example of this is the 28th Infantry Division (National Guard) G2 section's ODT to the V Corps Warfighter exercise in March 1999. They were able take advantage of their AC support rela-

Staff Sergeant Catherine E. Judy is processing a situation report during deployment to USAREUR.

tionship to purchase and train with WLNB systems. The 28th ID G2 filled a need for the AC sponsor (V Corps) and the G2 gained the opportunity to train in a state-of-the-art exercise.

The ARNG units do not have the personnel or the funding to have a full-blown ACE with a complete fielded ASAS system. The WLNB system gives the ARNG comparable capabilities for less money and the ability to train needed skills. Working on the equipment also gives RC soldiers the opportunity to develop their standing operating procedures. Configuring as a modified ACE will maximize our resources and limit shortfalls. The possible system make-up would be the following—

- Generic notebook or V2A2 Lightweight Computer, Pentium 300 megahertz, 4 gigabyte (GB) hard drive, 64 megabyte (MB) random access memory or greater.
- Internal or external 8x compact disc-read only memory and 1.44 MB triple-density floppy drive.
- External 4- to 8-mm 5-GB tape drive and an external 4.2 GB hard drive.
- APC 1250-volt intelligent uninterrupted power supply (UPS).
- Hewlett Packard Laserjet 4 megavolt with jet direct card, 28 MB of memory, and Hewlett Packard Laserjet 1600C with jet direct card and 14 MB of memory.

The WLNB gives the ARNG divisions and eSBs several advantages. It provides a commonality of hardware and interoperability with the AC. In this way, our units would have at least a portion of the automated intelligence capability of AC units we support. Having commonality with the AC gives our MI soldiers opportunities to train on real equipment and makes them more valuable during live environment training and overseas deployments.

ARNG divisions, eSBs, and MI battalions need to configure an ACE even if automation equipment is in short supply. This will accustom everyone to working in the current doctrinally correct configuration. ACE training now will also ease the transition from a non-automated environment to an automated one. Training on the systems will give soldiers an opportunity to use the Warlord software and learn the functionalities and database manipulation critical to today's information environment. Another advantage to the system is that it gives the G2 a graphic, multimedia presentation capability. This capability will not only help the G2 section but also the G3 in presenting operational briefs.

Bottom Line

Purchasing equipment will present a challenge for our units. However, without the tools of the trade, the ARNG MI soldiers will have no trade.✱

Major Tim Keasling is an ARNG Active Guard Reserve (AGR) officer currently serving as the Operations Officer, Senior Army National Guard Advisor's Office, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Headquarters, USAREUR. His previous positions were Assignments Officer at the National Guard Bureau, Personnel Directorate; Assistant G2, 38th Infantry Division; and Brigade S2 for the Combat Aviation Training Brigade at Fort Hood, Texas. MAJ Keasling has a Bachelor of Science degree in Business from Oakland College. Readers can reach him via E-mail at Keaslingt@hq.hqusareur.army.mil and telephonically at 011-4962-2157-8805 or DSN 370-8805/8001.

Looking For The Best

The U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) and its units are looking for highly motivated, physically fit, airborne qualified (or willing to go to airborne school), language speaking (DLPT 2/2), military intelligence soldiers. USASOC's units include the 75th Rangers, 160th Special Operations Aviation, special forces, psychological operations (PSYOPS), civil affairs, and the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS).

USASOC is looking for soldiers in the following military occupational specialties 96B (Intelligence Analyst), 96D (Imagery Analyst), 97B (Counterintelligence Agent), 97E (Interrogator), 98C (SIGINT Analyst), 98G (Voice Interceptor), and 98H (Communications Locator/Interceptor). USASOC includes not only Fort Bragg, Texas, locations but also includes Forts Campbell, Lewis, Carson, Benning, and Stewart/Hunter Army Airfield, as well as Germany, Okinawa, and Puerto Rico.

Interested personnel can contact Sergeant Major Fowler at USASOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, E-mail fowlers@soc.mil, (910) 396-6270/8389, DSN 239-6270/8389; or Sergeant First Class Dodd, USASOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, E-mail doddj@soc.mil. Come join the small number of MI professionals in the special operations community that are truly—the quiet professionals.

The 634th MI Battalion at a BCTP Warfighter Exercise

by Lieutenant Colonel Ronald C. Allen, MN ARNG, Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth J. Simurdiak, MN ARNG, and Captain Brian T. Dummann, MN ARNG

The Analysis and Control Element (ACE) concept has been very successful in integrating intelligence into one system and location. The backbone of the ACE is a computer system, the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS), which facilitates the integration of intelligence from many different sources. At a recent 34th Infantry Division (RC) Warfighter exercise, the 634th MI Battalion (from Rosemount, Minnesota) tested the ACE concept. Using our ASAS-substitute, the Warlord Notebook, we could collect and process data at a much higher rate than at any past Warfighter exercise. Intelligence can help commanders make decisions instead of having a historical record of what happened. For the first time, we can now predict the threat's next move and act—rather than reacting to the threat's latest move.

During our 1997 Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) Warfighter exercise—a simulated division exercise (six-day war)—Warlord Notebooks (WLNB) served in lieu of the ASAS system for the 634th's ACE. The ASAS stand-in resided on three Sun Microsystems Sparc-20® systems, and on eleven additional Intel®-based desktop and laptop computers. In addition, maneuver units from division down to the battalions had 45 Phoenix systems, a type of maneuver control system (MCS). Given the architectural similarities between WLNB and MCS, the WLNB system served as the processing and communications backbone for the battlefield intelligence system across the entire division.

In past Warfighter exercises, simulated intelligence collection came via line printers printing pages of textual message traffic. Without automated processing technology, MI soldiers needed to quickly read thousands of printed reports, plot them, and properly route the information. Even with several printers and an overstaffed ACE, it is virtually impossible to keep up with the message traffic. The WLNB eliminated the need to print and read all the message traffic. Instead, the system "digested" the messages and automatically stripped valuable information from the stream of reports and populated it into various databases on the WLNB. During the exercise, the 634th MI Battalion experienced message traffic rates more than 500 messages per hour; with the use of the WLNB, they were able to keep up with the traffic and the current situation.

ACE Architecture

The architecture of the ACE during the Warfighter exercise was perhaps the most critical piece of the puzzle. In preparation for the exercise, the 634th MI Battalion worked closely with the contractor for WLNB and the supporting XVIII Airborne Corps G2 staff to optimize the information flow within the ACE. The following system layout resulted—

- Single-source workstations (SSWs) processed the electronic message traffic for the three different types of intelligence received: communications intelligence (COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), and imagery intelligence (IMINT).
- The formatted messages fed into the WLNB; it extracted the data from the message traffic and sent it into databases on workstations in the ACE.
- The WLNB operator obtained real-time sensor data and plotted it on an electronic map, and the intelligence analysts analyzed the information.
- The SSW operators then used the analyzed data to construct digital overlays summarizing the battlefield picture on the all-source production workstation used for "fusion" of the data from the SSWs.

Unfortunately, the human intelligence (HUMINT) (patrols, long-range surveillance detachment, counterintelligence (CI) agents, etc.) workstation was not as automated as the other SSWs. Since much of the HUMINT information

Photo courtesy of author.

The All-Source Section of the ACE during the Warfighter exercise.

received by the ACE came over radio or though other channels, this workstation required a great deal of manual data entry to depict or display locations and other information.

In the area of all-source production, these systems received the "cleansed" overlays from the SSWs and "fused" the data from multiple sources. After analyzing this single-source data, they updated the locations of enemy units in an order of battle (OB) database. Concurrently, an additional workstation developed digital overlays showing predictive intelligence. They disseminated the overlays and the enemy OB database to the other WLNB systems within the ACE and to the various Phoenix MCS locations throughout the division.

Improvements to the WLNB

This system improved our target nomination process. Given the rapid ability to process timely message traffic, we dedicated one workstation to the target nomination team. This terminal could monitor incoming message traffic, and sound alarms or display indicators for various high-payoff targets (essential enemy equipment or units). IMINT and ELINT traffic were the most beneficial to the targeting workstation.

The battle damage assessment (BDA) team tracked the status of the enemy's equipment and personnel. By monitoring IMINT and SALUTE (size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment) spot report traffic, this team used the WLNB to maintain enemy strength data with an accuracy within a few percent. The BDA data generated by this workstation augmented the data in the enemy OB database; this information was available to all WLNBs and Phoenix systems throughout the division. The Deep Battle Cell tracked the enemy units in near-real time; this led to several successful deep missions by the 34th ID's Aviation Brigade.

This system greatly improved dissemination because the information could be E-mailed in real time. This WLNB was the communications center and gatekeeper of information flowing into and from the ACE. This workstation served a critical role by ensuring that consumers of ACE intelligence products were able to receive the information in a usable form and timely manner. The 634th MI Battalion placed brigade intelligence liaison teams (Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support Element or IEWSE) at each brigade. The ACE positioned a workstation and two analysts at each brigade during this entire exercise to provide them 24-hour coverage. This configuration brought the brigade S2s and the ACE closer together and greatly improved communication to all of the Division's intelligence consumers. This also provided the brigade S2s with access to WLNBs and the ability to view, modify, and create digital overlays they could send to the ACE or other systems on the network.

Looking Forward

In preparation for the exercise, the 634th MI Battalion performed a fair amount of configuration and customized the WLNB systems to streamline the processing architecture in the ACE. Some of the custom enhancements included—

- A SALUTE report capture program.
- Integrated E-mail connectivity with various Windows®-based systems on the network.
- A WLNB-based ACE home page on the internal Warfighter network.
- Various custom scripts to automate transmission of databases and overlays to other workstations.

Future consideration for the 634th MI Battalion intelligence architecture will include better integration of collection management and asset management into the WLNB environment during its next Warfighter exercise.*

(Continued on page 25)

The Intelligence Center's Supervisor Survey Program

by Major General John D. Thomas, Jr., and James B. Ellsworth, Ph.D.

The Intelligence Center's Student Critique Program helps our MI trainers know how well their courses facilitate student mastery of the skills and knowledge in the programs of instruction. It does not tell the Center whether those skills and knowledge are the competencies that leaders in the field need our graduates to have to accomplish today's mission. This is the objective of the Intelligence Center's new Supervisor Survey Program: to find out what our "customers" think we are doing well—and what they would like us to add, drop, or improve.

There is an old saying that *"efficiency is doing things right; effectiveness is **doing the right things!**"* In these terms, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) Student Critique Program has given us a good look at efficiency. For every intelligence course conducted at Fort Huachuca, we can estimate the average competency levels of our arriving students and the average competency levels of our departing graduates. The difference between these levels represents the impact of the course on the skills and knowledge of the soldiers we train.

Effectiveness, however, is another matter. The Graduate Follow-up Survey Program was dismantled during the Army drawdown, leaving us with no formal strategy for assessing the extent to which USAIC&FH courses continue to meet the changing requirements of the military intelligence (MI) mission. Frankly, we cannot rebuild such a personnel-intensive program with our current staffing. Nonetheless, we are obligated to seek feedback from our "customers," and to adapt the service we provide to meet their current and future needs. This is especially critical given the pace of change we are experiencing—and will continue to experience—as we evolve to create the Army of the next century.[1]

Getting There From Here

To meet this obligation, the Intelligence Center is implementing a new field survey program. This program will combine with the existing Student Critique System to create a comprehensive system for assessing the efficiency **and** effectiveness of USAIC&FH training in improving the on-the-job performance of our MI soldiers (see Figure 1).

This new program will consult first-line supervisors of recent graduates from USAIC&FH courses; however, not all the graduates' supervisors will receive a survey. Instead, we will use a sampling plan to ensure that we include supervisors representing each course's mix of strategic and tactical, MI and maneuver, and Army and joint units. This strategy will both ensure that our intelligence trainers obtain accurate and representative data using available resources and reduce the burden on the force of providing this data.

We will design the survey to obtain the most information with the least intrusion. In addition to demographic items, it will consist of two major sections. In the first section, it will ask the supervisors to comment on the skills and knowledge that USAIC&FH is **currently** teaching. This section will have a twofold purpose. First, it will allow the field to suggest that the Intelligence Center teach a particular competency differently or not teach it at all (perhaps because it no longer supports the mission or because soldiers require retraining to a specific system on arrival). Additionally, it will allow the field to assess the soldiers' skills and their knowledge in the areas currently taught. This latter information permits comparison to students' self-ratings at graduation to facilitate more accurate assessment of the lasting effect of training at USAIC&FH.


USAIC&FH Student Critique Program
Pre-Course Survey
Post-Course Survey
Performance Improvement from USAIC&FH Training (Students' Estimates)
Feedback on Efficiency: Performance Improvement in Current Subjects from USAIC&FH Training
USAIC&FH Supervisor Survey Program
Performance Improvement from USAIC&FH Training (Supervisors' Estimate)
Section 1: Current Subjects
Subjects to be Dropped from Course
Feedback on Effectiveness: Adjustments Required to Align USAIC&FH Curriculum with Mission
Section 2: New Subjects
Subjects to be Added to Course

Figure 1. The USAIC&FH Evaluation System.

The second survey section will ask supervisors to suggest **new** skills or knowledge not currently taught at Fort Huachuca, whose addition to a course would enhance the graduates' mission performance. Access to this type of feedback will help our MI trainers adapt the USAIC&FH curriculum to support the evolving requirements of our leaders in the field.

Return of the completed surveys to Fort Huachuca will be via channels appropriate to the classification level of the responses. This will give supervisors maximum flexibility to address the strengths and shortfalls of USAIC&FH training in light of the specific local mission.

Implementation Timeline

The Supervisor Survey Program will phase in for all USAIC&FH courses during the next year. This process has already begun, with the MI Officer Basic Course (MIOBC) serving as the pilot course. The first class tracked in this manner will graduate in early June 1999; first-line supervisors of new MI lieutenants can expect to receive surveys late this summer. This delay will allow the new graduates time to complete their permanent changes of station and leave enroute, and to assume their new duties for sufficient time to permit their supervisors to form opinions of their preparation and resulting competence.

This timeline will also allow us to identify the procedural lessons learned from the pilot, and brief the results at the U.S. Army Worldwide MI Conference. Reactions from the senior MI leaders in turn will facilitate fine-tuning of the program before we implement it for all other USAIC&FH courses.

The Commander Drives Intelligence Training

The ultimate intent of this program is to complete the cycle of the Human Performance Technology (HPT) model for organizational learning systems (see Figure 2). MI training exists to generate measurable improvements in the ability of our soldiers to perform their missions in the field. Only by gathering feedback from those who supervise execution of that mission can we assess the actual state of workforce performance we have achieved. Likewise, only in this fashion can we identify changes in the work, organizational, or competitive environment our units face—which must in turn refocus MI training on improving performance in these altered circumstances.



Figure 2. The Human Performance Technology Model.

With these factors known, we can compare the current state with the desired state implied by MI doctrine to identify the need—the gaps in performance—that the USAIC&FH curriculum must address. This in turn gives us the basis for determining the cause of these gaps, and thereby the "solution packages" with which we can most effectively solve them. When these packages involve training (i.e., when a gap is due to the soldier not knowing how to perform as desired[2]), the Intelligence Center's training developers can craft solutions incorporating resident or distance instruction, or both.

Of course, this same feedback can also guide the evolution of non-training, performance improvement solutions. We may discover areas in which innovation in the field has resulted in best practices or "Exemplary Performance" (Figure 2) which may be useful to the rest of the MI force. Consequently, we will provide the results from the Supervisor Survey Program to the Intelligence Center's Futures Directorate, where expert combat and materiel developers can evaluate their implications for MI doctrine and systems. Each of these dimensions—and some others—can play an important role in developing the most effective solution package to address a given performance gap. Former Army Chief of Staff General Carl Vuono identified six such dimensions as "fundamental imperatives" for the Army of the future:

- Effective warfighting doctrine.
- Mix of armored, light, and special operations forces.
- Continuous modernization.
- Development of competent, confident leaders.
- Unbending commitment to a quality force.
- Tough, demanding, and realistic training.[3]

Of these six imperatives, USAIC&FH has direct proponency for four in the context of Intelligence—doctrine, modernization, leader development, and training—and is a partner in achieving the others.

While this gives us the tools to create strategies for enhancing the MI force's ability to perform the real-world mission, the fact remains that merely **having** these tools is not enough. To apply them **effectively**, the Intelligence Center must actively collaborate with our Corps' leadership in the field to discover where our training has diverged from mission requirements. Only with your help can we craft the quality training needed to keep MI **Always Out Front!** ✷

Endnotes

1. Gramer, Jr., Colonel George K., "Development of the Cradle-to-Grave Training Strategies: Philosophy and Process," ***Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin***, July-September 1998, page 5.

2. Mager, Dr. Robert F. and Pipe, Peter, **Analyzing Performance Problems** (Sec-

ond Edition) (Pittman Learning, Inc., 1984), page 25.

3. Vuono, General Carl E., "Training and the Army of the 1990s," ***Military Review***, January 1991, page 3.

Major General John Thomas is the Commander of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca. Most recently, he was the Commander of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. He has also served in varied command and staff positions, including the Department of the Army Staff, Joint Staff, National Security Agency, Central Security Service, and overseas assignments in Germany and Korea. He received his Bachelor of Arts degree in History from Wilkes College, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, and a Master of Arts Degree in International Relations from the University of Southern California. He is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and the National War College. Readers can contact MG Thomas about this program via E-mail at thomasjd@huachuca-emh1.army.mil.

Dr. Jim Ellsworth is Chief of Evaluation Research and Development, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca. He has held a variety of training and development positions at the Intelligence Center, the Intelligence School–Devens, and the Armor School, including Chief of the Intelligence Center's WorldWide Web Office. He has a Bachelor of Science degree in Marketing and Computer-Based Management Systems from Clarkson University and a Master of Business Administration degree (in Management Information Systems) from Syracuse University. He earned a Doctor of Philosophy degree in Instructional Design, Development, and Evaluation from Syracuse University. He is a graduate of the MI Officer Advanced Course and the Training and Doctrine Command Middle Managers Course. Interested readers can reach Dr. Ellsworth via E-mail at ellsworthj@huachuca-emh1.army.mil and telephonically at (520) 538-7417 or DSN 879-7417.

ARISCs: Regional RC Intelligence Training Centers

(Continued from page 10)

2. "WARTRACE" in simple terms is a planning association of an RC unit with the organization with which it would go to war or to which it would be subordinate. It is somewhat dated but still used to describe associations ranging from training to actual war plans.

Major Eric Lamberson is currently the 748th MI Battalion Executive Officer. He enlisted in the U.S. Army as an Infantryman and served in the 82d Airborne Division and the 3d Infantry Regiment during his enlistment. In 1979, he departed active duty and entered the Army Reserve as a Combat Engineer (12B). During his Reserve tour, he served as an instructor at the Minewarfare and Demolitions Branch of the Engineer School as well as the Fort Belvoir Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course. Commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the Army Reserve after completing the Georgetown University Reserve Officer Training Corps program, he transferred to the AC where he served as a Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence (CEWI) Electronic Warfare Platoon Leader and Company Executive Officer in the Tactical Support Center CEWI until his assignment to the U.S. Army Field Station-San Antonio. At the USAFS (later redesignated the 748th MI Battalion), he served as a company commander and the G-Group Operations Officer and as the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) J2 Panama Analysis Division Branch Chief during post-JUST CAUSE operations in Panama. He served as the USSOUTHCOM Peru Tactical Analysis Team Commander in Lima, Peru, and commanded the USSOUTHCOM Brazil Tactical Analysis Team in 1996 and 1998. MAJ Lamberson earned a Bachelor of Arts degree from George Mason University in International Economics and International Relations and has a Master of Arts degree in Latin American Studies Tulane University. He is a graduate of both the Argentine Army Command and General Staff College resident course and the Brazilian Army CGSC resident course. Readers may contact him via E-mail at Eric.Lamberson@medina.aia.af.mil or telephonically (210) 671-2365 or DSN 473-2365.

The 634th MI Battalion at a BCTP Warfighter Exercise

(Continued from page 22)

Endnote

1. The 634th MI Battalion, 34th ID (RC), provides support to the XVIIIth Airborne Corps. See the unit profile on the inside back cover of this magazine.

Lieutenant Colonel Ron Allen, MN ARNG, commands the 634th Military Intelligence Battalion. His previous positions include Battalion S2, Brigade S2, and G2 Plans Officer. He is a licensed psychologist in his civilian career. LTC Allen holds a Ph.D. in Psychology from the University of South Dakota. He is attending the Reserve Post-Graduate Intelligence Program at the National Military Intelligence College in Washington, D.C.; Dr. Allen will earn a Master of Science in Strategic Studies degree through this program. Readers can contact him via E-mail at rallen@redwing.K12.MN.US and telephonically at (651) 282-4038.

Lieutenant Colonel Ken Simurdiak, MN ARNG, is the G2 for the 34th Infantry Division. His previous positions include Commander of the 682d Engineer Battalion and Division Training Officer. He recently graduated from the Army War College and holds a Master of Business Administration degree from the Winona State University. As his civilian occupation, LTC Simurdiak is an Engineering Manager for New Products with International Business Machines, Inc. His E-mail address is sims@millcomm.com.

Captain Brian Dummann, MN ARNG, is the ACE Dissemination Team Leader in the 634th MI Battalion. His previous positions include Platoon Leader and Executive Officer in Alpha Company, 134th MI Battalion. Captain Dummann holds a Master of Business Administration degree from the University of Minnesota. His civilian occupation is as a system's engineer for Medtronic, Inc. in Minneapolis, Minnesota. His E-mail address is brian.dummann@usa.net and you can reach him telephonically at (612) 514-3072.

Training Maximization

Reserve MI Unit Structure

by Sergeant James D. Higday

Editor's Note: The following article represents a suggested Reserve Component unit structure. This article does not necessarily represent actual or planned unit structures or the official policy of the U.S. Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Like the weather, the Army is always changing. Another Reserve MI unit will disappear by December 1999, maybe earlier, and another Reserve soldier faces a choice—continue to serve or leave the service. Most do not want the second choice and wish to continue to serve, but they must find a new unit that will meet their needs. This is becoming more difficult.

What are **our** needs? Reserve soldiers need to **train**. If called upon to supplement an Active unit, all any Reserve soldier wants to hear from the Active Component (AC) commander is "*job well done.*" However, the Reserve Component (RC) MI force needs to take a closer look at how we train and whether or not the current unit configurations are realistic to support the AC.

In reference to any RC MI unit, these questions must be answered—

- Do the current unit training schedules include realistic career field training?
- Do RC soldiers interact with AC units?
- Do AC exercises give the RC soldiers realistic experience?

If the answer is "no", "never", or "seldom" to any of these questions, that unit will likely be eliminated. A Reserve unit must do all three or lose its relevance in supporting the total force. Increasingly, unit structure plays a critical role in a Reserve unit's ability to train.

New RC MI Unit Concept

The Reserve MI unit structure should blend intelligence analysts, counterintelligence (CI) agents, MI support technicians, etc., into one unit. Organizing each Reserve MI company into separate functional platoons (analysts, CI specialists, human intelligence specialists, technicians, etc.) allows the commander to conduct individual, collective, and soldier tasks training within the rigid time constraints of Reserve units (see Figure 1). It also enables the commander to support the AC exercises and live contingencies through flexible "support packages," already tailored into functional elements.

As an example, I will describe the 631st Military Intelligence(MI) Company. The 631st MI Company is a new RC MI unit that will provide intelligence analysts and CI agents to the AC. Based in Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the 631st directly complements the XVIIIth Airborne Corps through the 525th MI Brigade. This Company also supports the MI needs of the 82d Airborne Division.

The 631st MI Company has three detachments located away from Fort Bragg. They are—

- Detachment 1, assigned to the 10th Mountain Division (Light), Fort Drum, New York.
- Detachment 2, assigned to the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, Georgia.
- Detachment 3, assigned to the 101st Airborne (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky.

The 631st MI Company has four platoons at Fort Bragg—

- 1st Platoon is the headquarters (HQ) Platoon consisting of mechanics, technicians, clerks, etc. Their primary training comes in the form of on-the-job training.
- 2d Platoon consists of four squads of 96Bs (intelligence analysts) with a Sergeant First Class leading each squad. A 350B (All-Source Intelligence Technician) warrant officer will



Figure 1. A Sample Reserve MI Company Structure.

be the officer in charge of each analytical team of five to six soldiers. Each platoon will have up to eight analytical teams.

- 3d Platoon has the same mix.
- 4th Platoon consists of 351B/97B (counterintelligence) military occupational specialty (MOS) teams with the same leadership structure as the 2d and 3d Platoons.

Training

The structure of the 631st creates greater uniformity for company training. Each Reserve unit only has two days per month to conduct training. It is very difficult to plan training so that intelligence soldiers train not only on common soldier tasks, but also train to master their MOSs. Because the company is broken into platoons based on functional specialties, each platoon can conduct training separate from the others—blending soldier, individual, and collective training. Consistency in the routine is important. It is the consistency that, over time, allows all the platoons to achieve a fully trained status.

A sample weekend drill schedule might include the following. First platoon performs all support and staff functions for both drill days. The HQ soldiers train in their MOSs only, no extra duty.

Second Platoon spends the first drill day training on individual analysis skills such as All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) training. Third platoon trains within their analytical teams (collective training) and simulating a tactical operations center (TOC), sharpening their situation map (SITMAP) and symbology skills. Team members rotate positions and maintain their understanding of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and order of battle (OB) products. The analytical team leaders drill their teams on every aspect of IPB. The second and third platoons swap their training on the second drill day, with Third Platoon focusing on individual training and second platoon focusing on team training.

Fourth platoon trains in the field on common tasks, small squad tactics, force protection, land navigation, and terrain analysis (soldier skill training). They spend their drill weekend in the field from 2200 hours Friday night until 1500 hours Sunday. During the next month's drill session, fourth platoon will conduct individual and collective training while another platoon focuses on field training.

Training schedules rotate each drill weekend. The 2d, 3d, and 4th platoons will spend at least three drill weekends in the field each year. All soldiers participate in a three-day exercise in the field with AC supervision. Each platoon has one full-time senior noncommissioned officer who is on AGR (Active Guard and Reserve) status to plan and assist team leaders during the drill weekend.

The 631st MI Company Detachments have similar training schedules, but on a smaller scale. Each detachment's main focus will be on understanding the mission of its specific division, and how best to support that division. When the AC division receives an alert for a mission the RC detachment personnel will brief incoming additional RC MI soldiers on how that specific division performs its mission and then assist in smoothly integrating the RC MI assets into the division. For a unit such as the 631st MI Company to succeed, both the AC and RC commanders must have a complete understanding of what to expect and be willing to assist in the integration.

Additional Units

I Corps and III Corps will each have a similar RC MI support configuration, but this is not enough to provide complete RC MI support for the U.S. Army. Each specific theater command should have a similar supporting MI battalion. Each battalion will focus training and integrate linguist skills in order to be completely familiar with a specific theater. Every battalion will have a linguist company (organized by speciality) supporting the specific theater. Figure 2 shows a sample structure for a European Command linguist Company. Each company and platoon should train in a similar fashion to the 631st MI Company.

Conclusion

This is just one of many suggestions for AC and RC MI commanders. However, the RC MI commanders must focus on MOS training and realistic training integration with AC units in order for RC MI to maintain force relevance and soldier morale in order to support the total force.✷



Figure 2. A Sample Reserve MI Linguist Company Structure.

Sergeant Higday is the Information Systems Security Sergeant for the 505th MI Group (RC). He has had assignments with the 651st MI Company, 337th MI Battalion, and has also served with the former Sixth Army Counterdrug Task Force, and the 3d U.S. Army G2, Counterterrorism Crisis Action Team (two tours). Sergeant Higday holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Business Administration from National University. He can be reached via E-mail at jdh527@aol.com.

U. S. Army National Guard M



The map shows the current locations of the Army National Guard's MI units. They are lin
units and does not reflect embedded MI elements such as G2 or S2 sections and TDA po
National Guard and is tied primarily to Guard combat divisions and separate brigades. T
serve the nation and use their MI skills with these organizations. Active duty soldiers int
recruiter or the local National Guard recruiter in the area where they intend to reside afte
traditional pay and benefits for each weekend drill and annual training, but may include

Map courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Stephen E. Por

Military Intelligence Units


4th MI Bn (-) (34th Div)
250th TEB, LRS Co
C CO, 341st Bn(L)
276th MI Co (76th SIB)
638th MI Bn (-) (38d Div)
642d MI Bn (-) (42d Div)
227th MI Co (27th SIB)
E Co, 223d MI Bn(L)
628th MI Bn (-)
(28th Div)
629th MI Bn (29th LT Div)
231 MI Co (31st SAB)
278th MI Co (278th ACR)
230th MI Co (30th HSB)
218th MI Co (218th HSB)
248th MI Co (48th SIB(M))
221st TEB
635th MI Bn (-) (35th Div)
253d MI Co (53d SIB)
260th MI Bn(L)
255th MI Co (155th SAB)
IB)
239th MI Co
(39th SIB)
256th MI Co (256th SIB(M))
415th Linguist Battalion
292 MI Co, SIB
(Puerto Rico ARNG)

linked to the state in which they are located. This graphic shows only the discrete MI positions across the entire Guard. MI has a relatively new force structure for the s. There are numerous opportunities for soldiers leaving Active Duty to continue to s interested in joining National Guard MI organizations should contact their in-service after they leave active duty. Service with the National Guard not only provides the de state educational, veterans, and other benefits.

Ponder, Reserve Affairs Office, Fort Huachuca.

Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program

by Captain Keith D. Filer and Chief Warrant Officer Two Edward A. Moore

The purpose of Army Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) Program is to exploit the current and future tactical potential of national space and theater intelligence systems and to integrate these capabilities into the Army's tactical decision-making process as rapidly as possible. The program provides the tactical commander immediate access to a variety of national, theater, and organic assets. With TENCAP assets, the commander has access to vital data he needs to make decisions.

For more than 25 years, the U.S. Army Space Program Office (ASPO) has been the proponent for managing the U.S. Army's TENCAP Program. Since inception, the ASPO has fielded numerous systems that provide the tactical commander from echelons-above-corps (EAC), corps, division, and the separate brigade access to national and theater collection capabilities. ASPO's approach was so successful that in 1977 Congress ordered all Services to establish a TENCAP program based on the Army's model.

TENCAP systems have deployed worldwide on a variety of ground mobile platforms ranging from 40-foot vans to high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), many containing portable workstations. Current TENCAP systems supporting EAC and corps include the Advanced Electronic Processing and Dissemination System (AEPDS), the Modernized Imagery Exploitation System (MIES) and the Enhanced Tactical Radar Correlator (ETRAC). (Figure 1 shows the TENCAP Program architecture.) The future of TENCAP is in the Tactical Exploitation System (TES), which will merge the above three systems. The Mobile Integrated Tactical Terminal (MITT) and Forward Area Support Terminal (FAST) are the current TENCAP systems found at the division, cavalry regiment, and separate brigades. The Division TES and the TES LITE will replace these systems.

Functions

The TENCAP systems allow the commander to see the entire battlefield and thus supports contingency and deep operations by—

- Furnishing the ability to see, hear and target deep, and then assess the impacts of shooting deep.
- Providing for mission planning and rehearsal with targeting, terrain ingress, and egress information.
- Improving command and control (C^2).

All TENCAP systems contain a robust communications capability, and are essentially stand-alone message centers. These range from Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE), satellite communications (SATCOMs), landline via the Automated Digital Information Network (AUTODIN)—which is migrating to the Defense Message System (DMS)—to STU-III (Secure Telephone Unit III). Connectivity to networks and systems such as the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) and Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) can be via the TROJAN Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminal (SPIRIT). The strength of TENCAP communications is the Secure UHF (ultrahigh frequency) Computer-Controlled Equipment Subsystem (SUCCESS) radio.

The SUCCESS radio is a fully automated, microprocessor-based, computer-controlled UHF-band radio. SUCCESS handles data over one transmit and three receive channels simultaneously. With two rack-mounted SUCCESS units stacked, you have an integrated, fully redundant, two transmit and six receive channel radio. Designed for ground and mobile sheltered environments, SUCCESS communicates with terrestrial, airborne, and satellite systems, the built-in Tactical Receive Equipment (TRE) processor accepts up to three simultaneous TDDS (TRAP (Tactical Related Applications Program) Data Dissemination System) or TADIXS-B (Tactical Data Information Exchange System-Broadcast)[1] broadcasts; it will transition to the Integrated Broadcast Service (IBS). In addition, with the incorporation of a TIBS (Tactical Information Broadcast System) Protocol Processing Unit (PPU), the SUCCESS radio can receive and process data from the TIBS broadcast. SUCCESS is interoperable with a wide range of existing UHF radios and meets



Figure courtesy of the U.S. Army Space Program Office

Key:

AEPDS	Advanced Electronic Processing and Dissemination System	LL	Low level
ATACMS	Army tactical missile system	MIES	Modern Imagery Exploitation System
CHARIOT	Portable S-band receive/transmit terminal	MITT	Mobile Integrated Tactical Terminal
CONUS	Continental United States	MLRS	Multiple launch rocket system
ETRAC	Enhanced Tactical Radar Correlator	MSE	Multiple Subscriber Equipment
FAST	Forward Area Support Terminal	SATCOM	Satellite communications
JFACC	Joint forces air component commander	UHF	Ultra-high frequency
		VHF	Very high frequency

Figure 1. TENCAP Program Architecture.

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) requirements for Satellite Communications (FLTSATCOM) interoperability. The improved SUCCESS radio incorporates a JCS-mandated Demand-Assigned Multiple Access (DAMA) capability.

The TENCAP architecture allows dissemination of multisource collection data to all echelons in near-real time using the TENCAP Communications Subsystem Processor (CSP), which provides the capability to receive and transmit data from multiple landlines and radiofrequency circuits. This equipment is common to all TENCAP systems and gives tactical decision-makers at all echelons the information they need, when they need it.

TENCAP systems can also perform as preprocessors for the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS), Digital Terrain Support System (DTSS), and the Common Ground Station (CGS). They use the TENCAP CSP for communicating with supported units and commands.

As today's TENCAP systems migrate to the TES, preprocessing for and interoperability with the ASAS is an essential requirement. This requirement extends to the creation of a seamless environment between the TES and the ASAS in which one can "push" or "pull" intelligence products, files, and databases between the two systems. This interactive environment will greatly enhance multiple-sensor integration and cross-sensor data integration where this improves target identification, geolocation, or both.

Corps and EAC TENCAP Systems

Advanced Electronic Processing and Dissemination System (AEPDS). The AEPDS is a

Photo courtesy of the U.S. Army.

Previously, 10th Mountain Division's FAST and the XVII Airborne Corps MITT deployed in support of Operations UPHOLD and MAINTAIN DEMOCRACY in Haiti...providing timely and detailed damage assessment for the task commander.

trailer-mounted, transportable system that receives and processes data collected by national, theater, and corps sensors and forwards the products to the tactical commands. It provides security sanitization or downgrading of the data it receives and provides tailored reporting to its supported units. Products of the AEPDS include tailored and automatic intelligence reports, electronic order of battle (EOB) updates, dynamic database processing and reporting, secondary imagery, and targeting data. The following MI Brigades have AEPDS systems: 201st, 501st, 502d, 504th, 513th, and 525th.

Modernized Imagery Exploitation System (MIES). The MIES is an imagery exploitation system capable of receiving, processing, exploiting, and disseminating national imagery and imagery products. MIES products include annotated secondary imagery dissemination (SID) products, intelligence reports, hard-copy prints, and imagery map products. Recently, a transition to Wolf Coach (or Wolf Coach-like) 31-foot shelters has enhanced system mobility, affording a C-130 aircraft drive-on/drive-off capability. These systems are organic to the XVIII Airborne Corps, V Corps, and the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM).

Enhanced Tactical Radar Correlator (ETRAC). The ETRAC provides all-weather, day and night, real-time image data to the joint task force or corps commander by receiving, processing, exploiting, and disseminating theater synthetic-aperture-radar (SAR) imagery from the U. S. Air Force U-2 aircraft. ETRAC also has the ability to dynamically control or task the sensor payload when required. ETRAC products include—

- Annotated SID products.
- Intelligence reports (including "GRAPHREPS" or icon-generating reports).
- Hardcopy prints and imagery.
- Map products.

The XVIIIth Airborne Corps and V Corps currently have ETRAC systems.

Tactical Exploitation System (TES). The TES combines the capabilities of the AEPDS, the MIES, and the ETRAC into a modular tailorable package that is rapidly deployable and is as mobile as the headquarters it supports. The TES will have both forward and main components. The forward component will be able to deploy with the initial entry forces to provide the commander with immediate national- and theater-level intelligence support. The design of the main component enables it to—

- Operate behind the initial entry forces.
- Support split-based operations.
- Provide continuous updates while a force is on the move. Conduct detailed analysis of intelligence collected.
- Maintain a master database.
- Gather intelligence on other areas of interest.

The scheduled delivery of the prototype TES to the XVIII Airborne Corps is in fiscal year 1999 (FY99). There will tentatively be five additional TES "Baseline" systems organic to corps and EAC units. The following article presents more detail on the TES LITE and the Division TES (DTES).

Support to Division and Below

Army TENCAP provides support to the division, armored cavalry regiments, and other specialty commands through the Mobile Integrated Tactical Terminal (MITT) and the Forward Area Support Terminal (FAST). The MITT provides AEPDS-like functionality in a more mobile vehicle, the HMMWV, than the trailer that comes with an AEPDS. The FAST, on the other hand, provides the functionality but is in portable, modular, survivable cases. The MITT and FAST systems both provide seamless multisource intelligence receipt, trans-

mission, and analysis of a wide range of intelligence products from national-, theater-, and tactical-collection assets. Products of the MITT and FAST include tailored and automatic intelligence reports, electronic order of battle (EOB) updates, dynamic database processing and reporting, secondary imagery, and targeting data. The MITT and the FAST were scheduled to be "de-fielded" in FY99 but, due to significant demand from the user community, these systems will not be removed from the inventory until the DTES and TES LITE replace them.

The Division TES and TES LITE will have at least the same functionality as the MITT and FAST, but will put these capabilities on the same hardware and software baseline as the TES. These systems will also host Global Broadcast System (GBS) receive capabilities.

Support to Stability Operations and Support Operations

TENCAP has been instrumental in providing intelligence and C^2 assistance in numerous stability operations and support operations from Somalia to Haiti to today's mission in Bosnia. At this time, the V Corps ETRAC is not deployed. We currently have a MITT from Fort Hood deployed in Bosnia and the MITT from Fort Drum will deploy there this summer.

Previously, a FAST (used by the 25th, 4th, and 10th Mountain Divisions), deployed in support of Operations UPHOLD DEMOCRACY and MAINTAIN DEMOCRACY in Haiti and was later replaced by the MITT from XVIII Airborne Corps. TENCAP not only provided intelligence data but, because of the communications capabilities that TENCAP brings to the theater of operations, TENCAP provided collection managers with additional C^2 capabilities. Additionally, during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, numerous TENCAP assets from XVIII Airborne Corps, VII Corps, V Corps, and III Corps deployed to Saudi Arabia. TENCAP systems provided the majority of targeting support for deep operations and imagery for intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) support of operation planning and maneuver for both XVIII and VII Corps. This was the first time that the TENCAP systems from all echelons deployed to support multinational forces. During all of these deployments, TENCAP systems provided near-real-time intelligence support to the tactical decision-makers for the alliance forces and were instrumental in providing robust communications support to all U.S. forces.

TENCAP systems have also served as significant sources of support to humanitarian efforts. For Hurricane Andrew, TENCAP systems provided timely and detailed damage assessment for the task force commander.

Future Initiatives

The ASPO and the TENCAP Program plan a number of future initiatives. These include Graphical Situation Display software and semiautomated and aided target recognition (ATR) processors.

GSD. The Graphical Situation Display is an Army-led joint program to standardize graphic information displays (see Figure 2). Integrating GSD concepts, methodologies, standards, and software modules into existing hardware and software architectures will deliver immediate benefits. First, the speed with which an analyst will be able to interpret the data before him and produce a report will increase dramatically and, in some instances, reporting may be automatic. Next, the generated reports will be readable by all other intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) and C^2 systems, layered in detail of data and echeloned presentation, and will fit into standard databases. Everyone will receive the same information but the layering and databasing capabilities will allow customers to write queries that are specific to their needs and echelons. This allows a commander at corps, for instance, to call-up a graphical depiction of all tank battalions in his area of interest; another commander can use the same database to display every individual tank in the battalion's area of interest. Both commanders could "flicker" between this data from an hour, a day, or a week ago to understand instantly the changes that have occurred.

GSD version 2.1 is available today. GSD's strong point is that it allows for the rapid transmission of graphical data over already over taxed networks. The system accomplishes this by sending only the graphic symbols. The software on the receiving end automatically places these symbols on the chosen background overlay.

Aided Target Recognition (ATR). The ASPO continues to research and develop ATR processors for integration into TENCAP systems. These processors will aid the imagery analyst initially in performing target detection from wide-area-search imagery. ATR algorithm processes will automatically scan the imagery as it processes it for specific patterns and shapes, and will notify the analyst, using GSD or icons, of target locations and perceived identities. The imagery analyst will confirm, deny, or modify the ATR's call and can then immediately release a preformatted message or graphic report to the customer. The current ATR program in which ASPO is participating is the Semi-Automated Imagery Processor (SAIP).

Conclusion

In today's environment of operations ranging from stability and support to full-scale war, it is imperative that MI provides the



Figure 2. The GSD provides an easy-to-interpret graphical representation of the battlefield in a layered manner (displays only the information in which the user is interested). It standardizes symbology to military standard (MIL STD) 2525.

commander with all relevant intelligence available. It is also imperative that commanders at all echelons have assured access to intelligence assets. TENCAP has a history of reliable delivery of the intelligence commanders require, when needed, in an easily used format. The future initiatives of TENCAP ensure that this tradition will continue and improve as we move into the 21st century. To find out more about TENCAP systems, ASPO, or the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) Futures Directorate, check the Internet website at http://aspo.army.mil/ or http://huachuca-dcd.army.mil/ respectively.*

Endnote

1. TADIXS-B, the Tactical Data Information Exchange System-Broadcast, is now known as the On-Board Processing/Direct Down-Link (OBP/DDL).

Captain Keith Filer is currently an Instructor for the Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course, 304th MI Battalion. He has previously held the positions of Commander, Headquarters Company, 306th MI Battalion, and TENCAP Team Chief, Requirements Division, Directorate of Combat Developments, Fort Huachuca, Arizona. He has a Bachelor of Business Administration degree in Risk Management and Insurance from the University of Georgia. Readers can contact him at (520) 533-6276, DSN 821-6276, and via E-mail at filerk@huachuca-emh1.army.mil.

Chief Warrant Officer Two Ed Moore is currently the Senior Imagery Intelligence Instructor, Warrant Officer Training, with C Company, 309th MI Battalion at the USAIC&FH. He has an Associate degree in Supervisory Leadership from Hawaii Pacific University. He previously held positions in the TENCAP Company (C Company, 319th MI Battalion) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, as both the officer in charge for the ETRAC and the TENCAP Operations Officer. Readers can contact him at (520) 533-4843, DSN 821-4843, and via E-mail at mooree@huachuca-emh1.army.mil.

MI Corps Hall of Fame Nominations

The Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence accepts nominations throughout the year for the MI Hall of Fame. A nominee (commissioned officer, warrant officer, enlisted soldier or NCO, or civilian) must have made a significant contribution to MI. Nominees cannot be employed by the U.S. Government in any capacity at the times of their nominations.

The OCMI provides information on nomination procedures. If you wish to nominate someone, contact OCMI, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-MI (Hall of Fame), Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000; call (520) 533-1181, DSN 821-1181, or E-mail chambersj@huachuca-emh1.army.mil.

TENCAP—
TES Into the 21st Century

by Lieutenant Colonel Randy D. Spilde and Sharon L. Carvalho

The Tactical Exploitation System (TES), characterized as a "system of systems," is the Army's objective Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) system for the 21st century. As with all TENCAP systems, we are building, fielding, and sustaining the TES through the streamlined acquisition methods authorized in the Army Space Program Office (ASPO) charter. ASPO has applied these methods since its formation in 1973.

This means that we produce a system in less time than with standard acquisition methods and field it as a prototype to the user—saving money and ensuring user involvement through continuous preplanned product improvement (P^3I) efforts. Another unique aspect of the acquisition process is ASPO's responsibility for integrated logistics support throughout the life of the system.

TES

The TES, scheduled for fielding beginning next year, will be a corps and echelons above corps (EAC) asset. It is a system of TENCAP functionalities in a single, integrated, scaleable system specifically designed for split-based operations. It will fully replace three current TENCAP systems:

- Advanced Electronic Processing and Dissemination System (AEPDS).
- Enhanced Tactical Radar Correlator (ETRAC).
- Modernized Imagery Exploitation System (MIES).

This next-generation system will serve as the interface between national systems and in-theater tactical forces, and it will receive data directly from theater and tactical assets. The TES will receive, process, exploit, and disseminate data from direct downlinks and from the ground stations for national and theater platforms.

Designed for split-based deployment, TES consists of both forward and main elements. The TES Forward is a high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle- (HMMWV) based element; vans house the TES Main. Each element has similar operational, communications, and support capabilities.

ASPO designed the TES to provide the commander with maximum flexibility to satisfy intelligence needs under a wide span of operational scenarios. The TES provides multiple configurations ranging from one C-130-deployable HMMWV early-entry capability to collocated Main and Forward elements with up to 40 operator workstations. TES operators can perform any imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), cross-intelligence, or dissemination function from any workstation. The TES also provides both quick set-up and tear-down and C-130 drive-on/drive-off capabilities to support rapid deployment.

TES will provide extensive communication capabilities, including ultrahigh frequency (UHF), S-, X-, C-, and Ku-band radio frequency (RF) communications. It will simultaneously receive multiple Tactical Related Applications (TRAP) and Tactical Information Broadcast Service (TIBS) broadcasts. TES will support full data and voice circuits via tactical and national communications systems. Furthermore, it will interface with and serve as the preprocessor for the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS), Common Ground Station (CGS), and the Digital Topographic Support System (DTSS).

The schedule calls for the Army to phase the TES into the inventory beginning this year with the XVIIIth Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Future fielding will occur with the 513th MI Brigade at Fort Gordon, Georgia; III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas; 501st MI Brigade in South Korea; and I Corps at Fort Lewis, Washington. The last TES delivery, scheduled in 2006, will go to V Corps in Germany. (Note: I Corps and V Corps will receive only partial TES systems.)

DTES

In an associated replacement venture, the ASPO has slated replacement of the current division asset, the Mobile Integrated Tactical Terminal (MITT), by the Division TES (DTES). The DTES is the objective division TENCAP system. The DTES is a HMMWV-mounted, multidiscipline processing and



Figure 1. TES Combines the Functionalities of AEPDS, ETRAC, and MIES in One Scaleable System.

analysis system capable of providing critical links to theater and national assets. The DTES will have components identical to parts of the TES Forward element. Its capabilities will include—

- UHF, GBS, and S-band communications.
- Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS), Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET), and Automatic Digital Network/Defense Message System (AUTODIN/DMS).
- Imagery and SIGINT processing and analysis.
- Imagery storage.

The Army will phase in the DTES beginning in 2001.✷

Lieutenant Colonel Randy Spilde is Chief of the Development Division at ASPO. He holds a Bachelor and Master of Science degrees in Electrical Engineering from the University of Iowa and the University of Idaho respectively. He is a graduate of Command and General Staff College and the Advanced Program Management Course. Readers can reach him via E-mail at spilder@aspo.army.mil and by telephone at (703) 428-8875 or DSN 328-8875.

Sharon Carvalho works on the Joint Staff; she was the ASPO TENCAP Writer-Editor. She holds a Bachelors degree in Anthropology from California State University at Fresno, and is a graduate of the Army Management Staff College. Readers can contact her via E-mail at sharon.carvalho@js.pentagon.mil or by telephone at (703) 695-6275 or DSN 225-6275.

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Strategic Intelligence Officers Course

by Major Richard C. Hoehne

The Strategic Intelligence Officers Course (SIOC) developed as result of the recent changes to **DA Pam 600-3, Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management**; it in turn was driven by the Officer Personnel Management (OPMS) XXI initiative that created Functional Area (FA) 34, Strategic Intelligence Officer (SIO). The course will prepare both non-MI and MI officers for the Postgraduate Intelligence Program (PGIP) and their follow-on assignments by concentrating on analytical skills and operational intelligence. The course will be "hands-on" with instruction modeled after the experiential theory of learning.

Officers assess into a functional area around the fifth year of commissioned service. SIOs are part of the Information Operations Career Field (CF). As soon as practical after the CF designation, FA 34 officers will attend the SIOC, enroute to the PGIP at the Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC). After successful completion of their theses and the PGIP program, the officers will receive the degree Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence (MSSI). FA 34 officers will then work in one of the strategic agencies or commands for a longer than usual period in order to develop specialized knowledge in the strategic realm.

The JMIC leadership has been very supportive of this project. There will be no redundancy in the courses. The SIOC will complement the graduate program by addressing long-standing academic and training deficiencies apparent in many Army PGIP students without strategic exposure.

Course Approach

The present (and foreseeable) international environment demands mental agility different from the Cold War "order of battle" paradigm. The SIOC enhances learning through ill-defined-problem solving. The course adopts experiential learning—where ill-defined problems have multiple solutions, solution paths, and contain uncertainty about the concepts, rules, organizations, and principles that lead to solutions. Hands-on system training, diverse case studies, engaging guest speakers, and research requirements are hallmarks of the course.

The Course

Because there will be MI and non-MI officers attending, the course requires a basic understanding of both Army and joint intelligence doctrine and terminology. Therefore, the 47-day course (see Figure 1) begins with a foundation block and introduces the Open-Source Information System (OSIS) for an unclassified research and briefing requirement.

The next block will introduce analytical theory: learning theory, learning tools, examination of analytical pitfalls, and finally experiential learning through the use of case studies. In addition, every week the students will train on a different intelligence information system. In all cases, extensive practical exercises will follow the instruction. The students will then use the systems to research the various study requirements. Several guest lecturers from both the government and academia will participate in this block of instruction. There will also be training on INTELINK (Intelligence Link) and an introduction to strategic thought.

The third block of the course introduces information operations (IO) doctrine and the students participate in several case studies on the effective or ineffective use of IO throughout U.S. military history. This phase of the instruction will prepare the student for application of IO in the capstone exercise. Proposed guest speakers for this block include representatives from



Figure 1. SIOC Course Flow.

the Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA), National Security Agency (NSA), Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the U.S. State Department.

The theme of the fourth week is collection management (CM); the students will first gain an understanding of CM doctrine and then conduct several case studies on effective and ineffective use of CM in current U.S. operations. This phase also sets the stage for the students' application of joint collection management operations in the next block and in the end-of-course capstone exercise. Guest speakers for this block include serving theater collection managers.

The next phase is on Intelligence Operations at the joint task force (JTF) and higher. This phase lasts 4.5 weeks and is the heart of the course. The first week covers Army intelligence operations at the division level and higher. The second week focuses on joint theater-level intelligence operations. The third week covers national intelligence operations and capabilities followed by a week on intelligence architecture-building from the JTF level through national level. The final three days explore the unique aspects of intelligence operations in stability and support operations.

Tying the training together is extensive intelligence systems training. The systems include the Military Intelligence Database (MIDB), demand-driven direct digital download system (5D, imagery database), COLISEUM (community on-line intelligence system for end users and managers), and RMS (Requirements Management System).

The course concludes with a crisis-action team practical exercise. It will test all of the previous instruction and systems training.

Conclusion

We at the Intelligence Center are excited about this course. We have recently modernized the entire intelligence architecture and will soon be able to train on virtually any system that the joint and national intelligence community uses. This year's program runs from 23 May until 30 July. Please contact either Major Rick Hoehne or Major Sal Gomez at (520) 533-1466 with any questions.*

Major Rick Hoehne currently is the Lead Course Developer for the Strategic Intelligence Officer Course at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Previously, he was the Executive Officer for the 304th MI Battalion. He has also served as a Brigade S2, Battalion S3, Company Commander, Intelligence Watch Officer, Field Artillery Battery Executive Officer, and Aide-de-camp in various stateside and overseas locations. He earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Economics from Northern Illinois University and a Master of Arts degree in Management from Webster University. He also holds a Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence from the Joint Military Intelligence College. He earned his commission via the Army Reserve Officer Training Corps from Northern Illinois University. Readers can contact MAJ Hoehne via E-mail at hoehner @huachuca-emh1.army.mil.

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QUICK TIPS

Integrated Training Area Management—A New Resource for Terrain Analysis

by Captain Robert L. Cordray, II

I first heard of Integrated Training Area Management (ITAM) when I was at the MI Officers Advanced Course in early 1998, and thought all it did was provide environmental-impact analysis of training areas at military posts. After some research, I realized it not only does that, but it also has the capability to do much more.

After arriving at Fort Riley, Kansas, I learned that I would be a battalion S2 for a National Training Center (NTC) rotation in a few months. I had to prepare.

Having never set foot in Fort Irwin, California, one of my concerns was terrain analysis: specifically my ability to describe the area of operations (AO) to my commander. I left no stone unturned in my search for maps and terrain products. I thought I had found the terrain analyst's dream when I uncovered a butcher-block compilation of maps produced by the 64th Engineer Detachment at Fort Hood, Texas, from June 1978. It included maps analyzing surface configuration and drainage, engineering soils and geology, cross-country movement and slope, lines of communication, etc. The problem was that it was twenty years old, and was not World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS-84)[1] datum. Although the terrain has not changed significantly in twenty years and I could convert coordinates to make it useful, I found a better way using ITAM technology.

The Fort Irwin ITAM Office, located in the range control building, houses hundreds of CD-ROMs (compact discs, read-only memory) containing data that terrain analysts and commanders need to plan missions. The difficulty is in assimilating all of the available terrain data into a useful product that the S2 can use for analysis and the commander can use to visualize the terrain or create an operational map. Clearly, the Fort Irwin ITAM Office alone cannot support every request of battalion and brigade S2s. This is where the ITAM office at your post can help. With only a coordinating request, Fort Irwin provided gigabytes of data to Fort Riley's ITAM office, enabling them to create terrain products of the NTC. In particular, they were able to provide any requested scale of the standard National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) NTC map, slope shaded maps, digitized overlays, updated road and trail networks, satellite imagery and soil composition maps. Most Army posts have ITAM offices, as well as the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and Combined Maneuver Training Center (CMTC).

Another unique capability of the ITAM office is its ability to produce data files for use in Terrabase (see http://www.wood.army.mil/TVC/TerraBaseII.htm). Commanders value Terrabase because of its ability to analyze threat weapons system range fans and provide intervisibility lines. At this time, there is not a Terrabase data file for the Fort Riley training areas, but we are working with the Fort Riley ITAM office to create a detailed, current WGS-84 data file.

The Army's ITAM program is operating at posts worldwide and is a valuable asset to S2s and terrain analysts. To see if a particular post is a participant, check the ITAM website (at home page http://www.army-itam.com/home.htm) and search by major command.

Endnote

1. The World Geodetic System 1984 is the most up-to-date datum used for producing map sheets of the NTC. WGS 84 and the similar North American Datum 1983 (NAD 83) supercede NAD 27 maps for currency and accuracy. The datum reference is on the upper right-hand corner of NIMA map sheets.

Captain Rob Cordray is the S2 for 2-70 Armor, 3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division. He graduated from the University of Oklahoma with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Management and received his commission through the Reserve Officer Training Corps. A branch-detailed officer, CPT Cordray's previous assignments include Tank Platoon Leader in 1-37 Armor and Adjutant for 1-63 Armor. He is a graduate of the Armor Basic Course, Military Intelligence Officer Transition and Advanced Courses, the Counterintelligence Course and the Combined Arms Senior Staff School. Readers can contact the author via E-mail at cordrayr@riley-emh1.army.mil and telephonically at (785) 239-1515 or DSN 856-1515.

Homepage Address

Please send us your Internet Unit Homepage address. ***MIPB*** will publish a list of MI unit homepages as a centerfold in a future issue. With the subject line "Unit Homepage," E-mail the unit homepage address to: mipb@huachuca-emh1.army.mil.

MI CORPS HALL OF FAME

Foreword

by Major General John D. Thomas, Jr., Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca

Military intelligence warrant officers are a critical part of our Corps. Their leadership, technical competence, and dedication serve as examples to their fellow soldiers and are critical in meeting the challenges of the 21st century Army.

To recognize the important contributions of our warrant officers and to ensure that we properly identify and address warrant officer issues, I have established the active duty position of Chief Warrant Officer of the MI Corps. Unlike those of the Chief, Sergeant Major, and Adjutant of the Corps, we aligned this post with a position here at the Home of MI. The senior warrant officer assigned to the Office of the Chief of MI (OCMI) will be the Warrant Officer of the Corps. The first Warrant Officer so honored is Chief Warrant Officer Five Rex Williams. Although already established, the position will receive formal recognition during the annual Hall of Fame ceremony on 25 June 1999.

Chief Warrant Officer of the MI Corps

Chief Warrant Officer Five Rex A. Williams entered the Army in September 1971. After completion of advanced individual training at Fort Huachuca as an Imagery Analyst, he served with the 2d MI Battalion (Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance) in Zweibrucken, Germany. He then completed tours at the 1st MI Battalion at Fort Bragg as a Section Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) in Charge and in the 704th MI Detachment (Aerial Surveillance) in Camp Humphries, Korea, as an Imagery Section Sergeant. He attained the rank of staff sergeant prior to his appointment as an Imagery Warrant Officer in March 1978.

After his appointment, he worked as a project officer for airborne imaging systems in the Directorate of Combat Developments (DCD) at Fort Huachuca. While assigned to DCD, he transitioned to All-Source Intelligence Technician (350B) and completed the MI Warrant Officer Advanced Course. In 1983, he became the Chief of the All-Source Production Section, 102d MI Battalion at Camp Casey, Korea. In 1984, CW5 Williams returned to Fort Huachuca where he served as the primary threat and intelligence analysis instructor for the MI Officer Advanced and Transition Courses as well as all warrant officer courses. CW5 Williams reassigned to the Intelligence Center–Pacific, Camp Smith, Hawaii, in 1986 where he served under the auspices of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Delegated Producer Program as the Chief of the Pacific Theater Order of Battle (OB) Production Section. Again assigned to the U.S. Army Intelligence Center in 1990, he again was the chief of warrant officer training; he managed all warrant officer courses and taught leadership, professional development, and various intelligence subjects.

In 1993, he became the Chief of an inter-Service intelligence production section and served as a senior intelligence analyst during crisis periods at the U.S. Central Command Joint Intelligence Center at Macdill Air Force Base, Florida. During his tour, he attended the Warrant Officer Senior Staff Course at Fort Rucker, Alabama, and achieved his current grade. Since 1995, CW5 Williams has served in his current position with the OCMI.

HOF Inductions for 1999

The Military Intelligence Corps is proud to announce the names of the six most recent inductees into the MI Corps Hall of Fame. This high honor recognizes the outstanding contributions made by these distinguished Americans to our country, our Army, and our Corps. The 1999 Hall of Fame inductees are: Colonel John F. Concannon, III (Retired), Colonel Byron K. Dean (Retired), Lieuten-

ant Colonel William L. Parkinson (Deceased), Lieutenant Colonel Robert V. Taylor (Retired), Colonel Harold W. Vorhies (Retired), and Colonel Charles D. Young (Deceased). The 1999 Induction Ceremony to honor these remarkable gentleman will be on Friday, 25 June 1999. We invite you to attend this special event.

Colonel John F. Concannon, III (Retired)

Colonel (COL) John Concannon retired from active duty in June 1995 after thirty years of service. During that time, he remained at the forefront of Army Intelligence by successfully framing Soviet strategic challenges. As Chief of the Warsaw Pact Division, U.S. Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (ITAC), he was the principle MI leader responsible for production of the multi-volume **Soviet Battlefield Development Plan**, the *Land Armament Manpower Model*, and most imporantly, in-depth analyses of the Soviet theater and strategic operations. His efforts in developing these documents significantly influenced strategic policy at the highest levels.

During his MI assignments, he became the Army's premier expert on Soviet politico-military affairs. He was the principal intelligence officer responsible to a task force operating under the U.S. Army Chief of Staff to develop guidance and direction to improve our national defense. His knowledge of the effects of a rapidly changing strategic environment on the future structure of the Army enabled him to provide direction on how best to posture the Army for the future.

Colonel Concannon's contributions to national intelligence were equally impressive. He was the Army leader in the DIA's study on the correlation of forces opposite the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and was instrumental in defining the threat and subsequent NATO conventional and theater nuclear force options. His efforts impacted significantly on the European strategic balance and the consequent NATO and Army strategic and operational responses. He implemented a wide variety of plans, policies, and recommendations supporting NATO's correlation of forces strategy and to incorporate them into intelligence requirements to support both deterrence and warfighting operations. During a succession of attaché assignments, his information collection initiatives contributed immeasurably. He is a member of the Defense Attaché Hall of Fame.

Colonel Byron K. Dean (Retired)

Colonel Byron Dean's distinguished Army career covers 34 years of service. Entering the Army as a private, he advanced to positions of senior leadership and great responsibility in MI. His significant contributions will have a lasting impact well into the 21st century.

Colonel Dean had combat experience in Vietnam, served in three infantry divisions, and became an expert in tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for tactical-, operational-, and strategic-level intelligence operations. He served in important positions at the component, joint, and combined levels and commanded at every level from platoon through brigade. He was the Executive Assistant to the Army's Senior Intelligence Officer, served as an Army Major Command Chief of Staff, and became the first non-general-officer to serve as Deputy Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM).

During his last five years in the Army, he contributed to numerous endeavors that helped Army Intelligence make the transition from a single-threat force to a lean combat force ready to meet any threat. His contributions include—

- Serving as one of the primary authors of *MI 2000*.
- Making crucial recommendations on MI task organization and product support by MI forces for Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.
- Leading the effort to reorganize and revitalize Army human intelligence (HUMINT).
- Supervising the transition of Army signals intelligence (SIGINT) from fixed station to regionally focused operations.
- Playing a major role in the downsizing of INSCOM, while preserving the critical capabilities and skills required to support the combat commander.

Mr. William L. Parkinson (Deceased)

William Parkinson devoted his entire career to HUMINT activities; he retired from the Army Reserve as a Lieutenant Colonel. During the early days in post-World War II Germany, he was a staff manager in the U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) Headquarters. In that role, Mr. Parkinson produced outstanding results concurrently as a counterintelligence (CI) research analyst and estimates officer and as a field operations manager in two critical CI target areas: subversive residual right radicalism in West Germany and the development of the national security structure in the redeveloping West German Government. In 1948, he left active duty to accept civilian employment with Headquarters, 970th CIC Detachment.

Until his departure from Germany in 1956, Mr. Parkinson was the recognized U.S. MI authority on the new West German Defense Ministry and the newly established West German intelligence and security agencies. His reports and analyses in these fields were a basis for U.S. military and political policy. Concurrently, he personally managed U.S. Army CI liaison and cooperation with these German agencies at all levels. Army CI liaison officers working directly with West German CI and security offices relied heavily on Mr. Parkinson's guidance and counsel in assisting the post-war development of these activities.

Mr. Parkinson was an important figure in the successful development and implementation of what was then a new and unusual Army civilian personnel career management program for Army HUMINT and CI personnel, the Military Intelligence Civilian Excepted-Service Career Program (MICEP). He ensured that operational mission requirements had high priority in development and execution of the MICEP. At that time, civilian career managers strongly resisted changes required to meet the unique needs of intelligence organizations. Over the years, the program has received high praise. To this day, the MICEP remains a viable career option for HUMINT specialists.

During his tenure in CI analysis at Headquarters, Department of the Army (DA), Mr. Parkinson required the highest quality analytical reports and estimates from his subordinates. Additionally, he was uniquely talented in mentoring and helping to develop especially promising junior military and civilian personnel; he was as productive in mentoring and developing less experienced HUMINT and CI personnel during his extended assignment in Southeast Asia in the 1970s.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert V. Taylor (Retired)

Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Robert Taylor worked as an imagery analyst under the operational control of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) at the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) in Washington, D.C. He was a member of a team of imagery interpreters who located and reported the presence of Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba to the National Command Authority, thus permitting President John F. Kennedy to pressure the Soviets and cause them to withdraw the missiles.

Later, in Southeast Asia, his team was first to discover the North Vietnamese efforts to construct a road network that extended from North Vietnam through Laos and Cambodia to the border regions of South Vietnam. This road network was the "Ho Chi Minh Trail." This data provided vital targeting information to the U.S. Air Force.

LTC Taylor's duty at NPIC, coupled with the knowledge he had acquired about national imagery systems, made him the first Army officer to realize the potential of national collection systems to satisfy tactical commanders' requirements. During subsequent assignments in Vietnam and in Europe, he began his long crusade, eventually ensuring that products from national collection systems were available to tactical commanders. A pioneer in this effort, he helped the Army leadership understand how timely imagery and data from national systems could be made available to tactical commanders.

Assigned to the Combat Developments Command–Intelligence Agency, Fort Huachuca in 1971, he retired the following year, and returned as a DA civilian in 1973. He devoted the remainder of his government service toward fulfilling and advancing products from national imagery systems. He was the author of **Army Tactical Re-**

connaissance Needs for National-Level Reconnaissance Products and the system interfaces to provide these products to the tactical users. The systems that he designed served our nation during Operation DESERT STORM.

Colonel Harold W. Vorhies (Retired)

Colonel Harold Vorhies entered military service in 1953. Commissioned a Second Lieutenant, he served nine years with the Quartermaster Corps and the Field Artillery. Assignment with the U.S. Army Security Agency (USASA) led to his spending the remainder of his thirty years of service in the MI Corps.

Early in his career, he was instrumental in the development and implementation of a new system of inventory management, equipment requirements, and budget computation which saved USASA an estimated $6 million. As a logistics expert for the Department of Defense, he directed a high-priority airborne SIGINT and electronic warfare system; his efforts contributed to the successful fielding of one of the Army's earliest EW airborne systems in Southeast Asia.

While assigned to J2, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, his initiatives as the Chief, Documents Branch, and the Director, U.S. Element Combined Document Exploitation Center resulted in major improvements in collection, production, and dissemination of information which provided MI valuable lessons. His actions earned him the Republic of Korea Order of Military Merit (In Hun) from Korea's President, Park Jung Hee, and the Staff Service Honor Medal from the Republic of Vietnam.

Later, Colonel Vorhies served in command and staff assignments at USASA and INSCOM, to include Commander, Arlington Hall Station, Virginia, and Commander, 504th ASA Group. Between these two command assignments, Colonel Vorhies also served as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, and Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations. In 1978, he moved to the National Security Agency, where he served successively as Deputy Chief NSA/Central Security Service–Europe (1978 to 1982), and at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, as Program Manager for a special project related to improving SIGINT support to tactical commanders (1982 through 1983). Colonel Vorhies was a leader in the formalization and maturation of today's MI structure. Serving throughout the Cold War and numerous crises, he consistently contributed to the successful accomplishment of the MI mission.

Colonel Charles D. Young (Deceased)

Colonel Charles Young was an African-American cavalry officer who held important intelligence assignments in the early years of the 20th century. He was the third black to graduate from West Point, and the only one to endure the racial injustice of the times and still made the Army his career. He did not receive the respect afforded to other officers because of his skin color. Junior officers refused to salute him and bigots taunted him. Colonel Young overcame this open hatred and disrespect by mastering his profession and leading by example. He did not become a leader by virtue of his commission in the U.S. Army—he earned it by working harder than any other officer and by displaying courage and intelligence in combat.

As a Major, Charles Young led the 2d Squadron, 10th Cavalry, in a pistol charge at Agua Caliente, which scattered Poncho Villa's forces led by General Beltran. Later in that campaign, Colonel Young rode with his squadron to relieve the 13th U.S. Cavalry besieged by Mexican forces.

He was an accomplished linguist and, when he was not serving with one of the Black Regiments, he worked in intelligence. He was one of the early military attachés, making extended reconnaissance missions into Haiti and Santo Domingo. He reported for duty in 1907 to the War Department's 2d Division; this was the name given to the section of the new general staff responsible for collecting and disseminating MI. He served on two more occasions as a military attaché in additional tours to Liberia.

Forced to retire due to a disability on the brink of World War I, he demonstrated his fitness for further duty. Colonel Young rode on horseback from Wilberforce, Ohio, to Washington, D.C., where he offered his services to the war effort,

in his words *"gladly at the risk of life, which has no value to me if I cannot give it for the great ends for which the United States is striving."* The War Department did not accept his offer; instead, he again went on attaché duties to Liberia, where he died of fever in January 1922.

LETTERS

To the Editor:

I enjoyed reading Colonel Lawrence Arrol's article on intelligence fusion in the October-December 1998 issue of ***MIPB***. He did an excellent job of presenting the complex process the Army faces in getting from here to the future to implement MI initiatives under Force XXI. However, I see a continuing shortfall in the Army's conceptualization of how to provide the agility and adaptability that today's "unconventional" and tomorrow's "conventional" military operations entail. His article and the others in that issue follow a long-standing bias in the Army's analysis of the basic MI problem—the premise that the Army needs to increase the flow in the "data firehose" rather than help the firemen select the pressure and flow actually required.

For several years, I worked with a group who thought that the traditional Department of Defense sanctioned concept of intelligence fusion had a serious underlying fault—it focused on the output of sensors and automated "fusers" and not on the needs of a commander. In 1993, we proposed that modeling and simulation efforts, as well as research and development of new hardware, should focus on understanding how intelligence needs are developed, communicated, and satisfied, from the commander's perspective—not from the perspective of the collection device and analysis tools operators.

Creating an MI capability that fully employs all the tools available produces a reversal of requirements. We no longer should plan from the perspective of what means are possible, rather we should plan from the perspective of who needs what information, and in what form.

My question is: how does the Army now define **data fusion**? Is that definition appropriate from both sides—from the needs of technical developers and from the needs of commanders? [Note: The comments above are my own and do not reflect the official opinion of the Department of Energy, Argonne National Laboratory, or the University of Chicago.]

Thomas B. Baines
Lemont, Illinois

Colonel Arrol's Response:

What you and most intelligence professionals view as a shortfall, maneuver commander's view as a necessity. "*Send all you know about the tactical situation, as soon as possible.*" Modern computer technology now allows for a greater data volume than previously. The ASAS Remote Workstations exterior to the analysis and control element (ACE) contain software that permits low-level data fusion that can accommodate the large data volumes presented to the commander today. Analysts handle this data while providing a simple, aggregated display on a map with standard unit symbols.

The commander is able to see on a map the enemy's disposition, combat strengths, and force composition—in short, the order of battle. This applies equally to peacekeeping and other stability operations. Therefore, the commander can ask more detailed questions that are about his situation while deriving the intent of his adversary. The evolving ASAS system also causes the intelligence analyst to once again focus on intelligence skills, rather than just typing on a keyboard directing the volumes of data in the system.

The Joint Directors of Laboratories' definition of **data fusion** is still in general use. It **is** undergoing modification to reflect more accurately the "fusion of data" as opposed to its previous focus on "intelligence fusion."

If you consider the line drawing of the ACE in the article—the Joint Collection Management Tools (JCMT) aids in tasking all collection assets (both organic and non-organic), and taskings come from the maneuver commanders as well as intelligence analysts—you will see a fundamental difference from what you describe. As the analyst steers collection to meet the commander's needs and responds to the commander's intelligence requirements, it is clear that the commander drives intelligence.

Finally, here is an answer to your question. **Data fusion** is first a process performed by multiple sources at various levels. At the lowest level it is simple correlation of associates and combination. At the highest level, it is impact assessment in the intelligence fusion environment—referred to as **threat refinement**. Finally, the model has a function called process refinement that controls the total data fusion process.

Remember, if your only tool is a hammer, everything in the world is a nail. In intelligence fusion, if your only tool is a ground surveillance radar, then everything in the world is an armored vehicle.

Colonel Lawrence G. J. Arrol
Project Manager Intelligence Fusion
McLean, Virginia

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield in a MOUT Environment

by Michael P. Ley

Throughout history, military planners have viewed cities as centers of gravity. Cities are population centers, transportation hubs, seats of government, industrial sites, communication networks, and important transportation nodes (e.g., highways, rail lines, river traffic). Recent forecasts based on population statistics and worldwide migration trends show the continued movement of people away from agrarian to industrialized societies. As the population migrates to urban areas, the military significance of cities is likely to grow proportionately.

Current tactical doctrine states that we conduct urban combat operations ***only*** when absolutely required. Doctrine recommends that we isolate and bypass built-up areas rather than risking a costly, time-consuming operation. Adherence to these precepts, however, is becoming increasingly difficult as the world develops more urban areas. To minimize collateral damage and comply with the rules of engagement, we cannot reduce an urban area to rubble and then bypass it. Military operations in urbanized terrain (MOUT) are even more difficult as part of a stability operation or support operation due to the importance of the local population to that operation.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is a systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment. Foremost, its design will support the military decision-making process. The proper use of the IPB process helps commanders to selectively apply and maximize their combat power at critical points in time and space by determining the threat's possible courses of action (COAs) (in order of likelihood), describing the environment their units are operating within, and explaining the effects of the environment will have on them.

IPB has other considerations such as—

- Focusing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations to meet the intelligence requirements.
- Target development and intelligence support to targeting.
- Providing a structured framework to use in performing situation development during the execution of an operation.
- Enhancing the ability of commanders and staffs to conduct operations in a dynamic environment where timely decisions are critical to the operation.

As an important special environment for military operations, the next revision of **FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield**, will have a chapter on IPB in MOUT. **We need your input to help develop doctrine and detailed procedures for this important topic**. The intention of this article is to provoke dialogue and provide a framework in which to analyze the environment in a MOUT environment—from a major European city to a third world "shanty town." However, this article will not provide a detailed description of IPB or change existing IPB methodology.

MOUT IPB: A Difficult Environment

With the exception of large-scale amphibious assaults, MOUT may be the most complex of all military operations. While many believe MOUT is exclusive to larger cities, they may also be conducted in or adjacent to urban areas of all sizes. The intelligence analyst needs a method to quickly determine the crucial components of the MOUT environment, which will allow more time for detailed analysis later. Use of this "shortcut" places the types and details of the MOUT environment at the forefront of the IPB effort and provides the supported commander with a quick environmental analysis.

The critical element necessary to perform adequate IPB in unique environments is the ability to understand, break down, and then draw conclusions about an unconventional environment and the threat. Therefore, it is critical to quickly analyze and present an accurate, detailed picture of the environment. The analyst must deal with complex characteristics of the urban environment and present concerns such as—

- Describing the many effects of an industrial area within a city.
- Identifying a combination of canals and rivers as one or more lines of communication (LOC).
- Describing underground structures such as large basements, subways, or sewer systems.
- Templating multi-story buildings (an additional dimension of the environment).
- Analyzing economic concerns by ethnic sections within a city.



Figure 1. The MOUT Environment Framework.

Because of the diversity of MOUT environments, many analysts have difficulty identifying a starting point in their analysis of the environment. The following framework offers a user-friendly process for analyzing the MOUT environment.

A Unique Analytical Framework

The MOUT environment framework (see Figure 1) is a tool designed to facilitate the analyst's efforts in analyzing the components that comprise the MOUT environment; **it is not a stand-alone tool.** This framework was based on an initial analysis of MOUT doctrine found in **FM 90-10**, **Military Operations in Urban Terrain**, and **FM 34-130**, **Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield**. The use of the framework allows the analyst to—

- Focus on very specific aspects of the MOUT environment.
- Analyze the environment using a logical, sequential process.
- Establish parameters for the initial analysis of the environment.
- Obtain results quickly.
- Start a more detailed IPB analysis already armed with a general understanding of the environment.

Step 1, General Urban Description. Define your area of interest (AI) in accordance with **FM 34-130.** Start your analysis by categorizing the urban area as a large city (population >100,00), a town or small city (3,000 to 100,00), a village (population <3,000), or a strip area (a built-up area connecting villages, towns, or cities). Then record any general data such as the exact population figures and whether the population is homogenous cohesive or fractional splintered.

Step 2, Building and Street Patterns. Subdivide the AI into the appropriate building and street patterns:

Type A: dense, random construction.

Type B: closed-orderly block.

Type C: dispersed residential area.

Type D: high-rise area.

Type E: industrial and transportation area.

Step 3, Lines of Communications. Identify all LOCs in the AI.

Step	Consideration	Analysis	Analytical Notes
1	General Urban Description	Large city	Population 267,000.
2	Building and Street Patterns	B, D, and E	Predominantly B, D in sectors 1 and 4, and E in sector 8.
3	LOCs	A highway and a canal	Highway 8 to Fez and #5 canal.
4	Urban Patterns	Hub	Part of a larger satellite pattern in the region.
5	Pattern Effects	Funnel-fan	Hilly terrain on both sides of the hub.
6	Military Aspects of the Terrain	Observation/fields of fire Cover and concealment Obstacles Key Terrain	Sectors 3 and 4 poor observation and fields of fire. Sector 3 and 4 mostly good cover and concealment. Sectors 1, 4, and 8 have many obstacles (war debris). Sarbin Hills and Kulet Ridge in sectors 1 and 2.
7	Mobility Corridors	Air Level Above-Ground Level Building Level Subterranean Level	Sectors 6 and 7 poor (many power lines). Skyscrapers sectors 1 and 4. Densely packed buildings sectors 2 and 6. Sector 1 with underground tunnels, all other areas subjected to the effects of a high water table.
8	Other Significant Characteristics	Sectors 1 and 3 Catholic Sector 4 Moslem Tobon political party	Ethnic Kuri and Bari populations make up 89% of the city's population. Armed militias are prevalent in sectors 4 and 6.

Figure 2. A Sample MOUT Enviroment Worksheet.

Step 4, Urban Patterns. The combination of built-up areas, LOCs, and natural terrain results in the formation of urban patterns that impact on operations. Subdivide the AI into the appropriate urban patterns.

The hub is the central built-up area and the foundation of any urban area. The satellite pattern is a common pattern with a hub and relatively dependent, dispersed, smaller built-up areas. LOCs tend to flow from the hub to the smaller urban areas normally in the form of farms, forests, or secondary roads. The **network pattern** is similar in appearance to the satellite pattern, but the network is vastly more complex and diverse. Unlike the satellite pattern, the network pattern is more self-sufficient and less supportive of each node, although a dominant hub may exist. A network's major LOCs are more extensive than those in a satellite pattern and take a rectangular rather than convergent form. The **linear pattern** is the most frequent pattern resulting from stringing minor hubs along a confined natural terrain corridor such as an elongated valley. It can also result from one spoke of a satellite pattern or a connection between the hubs of a network pattern. The **segment** or **pie slice pattern** may occur as a subset of either the satellite or network patterns, or within a major hub. Splitting of an urban area by dominant natural features such as a river or by man-made features such as roads, railways, or canal characterizes the segment or slice pattern.

Step 5, Pattern Effects. Describe the pattern effects on both friendly and enemy forces. The building and street pattern and urban pattern may have one of three effects on a large military force (based on the type of friendly or enemy force): blocking, funnel-fan, or funnel effects.

In the **blocking effect**, the hub often has the effect of almost completely blocking an operation. The **funnel-fan effect** occurs when a hub is between terrain features unsuitable for the operation. Forces tend to funnel (and lose momentum) as they enter into the urban hub and fan back out when they reach the other side of the hub. In the third type of effect, the **funnel effect** will normally occur when forces encounter a linear pattern and forces cannot immediately fan out.

Step 6, Military Aspects of the Terrain. Analyze the military aspects of the terrain in accordance with **FM 34-130**. It discusses observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach (OCOKA).

Step 7, Mobility Corridors. Perform a detailed analysis of general mobility corridors and avenues of approach. Specify each corridor as either subterranean level, ground-level, building level, above ground level (e.g., overpasses, elevated walk-ways), or air level.

Step 8, Other Significant Characteristics. Analyze the other significant characteristics of the environment as stated in **FM**

34-130. These characteristics can include current issues, the local historical perspective, weather, population demographics (e.g., ethnic and cultural groups, religious groups, language, literacy, age distribution), government and political or socioeconomic factors (e.g., roles of clans, tribes, organized crime, gangs), infrastructure (e.g., telecommunications, and electrical lines), and economic data.

When using the framework, the analyst must realize that these considerations are part of Step 2 of the IPB process: *describe the battlefield environment*. Analysis using this framework can usually finish well before the military decision-making process starts for the operation. The analysts must still complete steps 1 through 4 of the IPB process as described in **FM 34-130**. The framework provided should be seen as solely an "up front" analytical tool applied to the very specific demands of the MOUT environment.

The MOUT Environment Worksheet

As a tool to help analysts use the framework the MOUT environment worksheet (see Figure 2) allows the analysts to quickly capture (in text format) some of their analysis. Analysts also need to produce many graphic products to integrate their analyses of the environment with the other steps of IPB.

Conclusion

Analysis of the MOUT environment is a complex task even when working in less than a major urban area. Use of this framework and worksheet checklist will greatly facilitate the IPB process by focusing analysts and helping them develop a quick but comprehensive picture of the environment. As we in the Doctrine Division grapple with this issue, we need your input. If you want to provide input on this topic feel free to contact Mr. Ley at commercial (520) 538-0979, DSN 879-0979, or via E-mail at leym@huachuca-emh1.army.mil. Additionally, watch for the initial draft of **FM 34-130** on our web page (http://138.27.35.36/Doctrine/dlb.htm) this spring.

*Mr. Mike Ley is currently a doctrine writer at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center. Mr. Ley retired from the Army in 1990. While on active duty, he served two tours as an military advisor in the Republic of Vietnam. He also served as a Polish linguist at Field Station Berlin. He was the Operations Officer for the 265th Army Security Agency (ASA) Company and was the S2 for 2/503d Infantry Battalion at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. He also served as the Operational Test Officer, Intelligence and Security Board, and Independent Evaluator, Combat Developments Directorate, at Fort Huachuca. He was also the Collection Management Liaison Officer for the Third Republic of Korea (ROK) Army and later worked as a software test engineer on the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) and on TRW's Hunter UAV project. He is a graduate of Ohio University, Athens, with a degree in cartography. Mr. Ley is currently updating **FM 34-3, Intelligence Analysis and Synthesis**, and **FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield**.*

Coming for Training at Fort Huachuca?

Useful Contacts

The website for all USAIC courses is http://huachuca-usaic.army.mil/SCHOOL/training.html

Officer Advance Course/Officer Transition Course ACE Chief/G2 Course/PCC

A Company, 304th MI Battalion

Website:http://huachuca-usaic.army.mil/contlearning/304mi/a304th/a304.htm

Phone: (520) 533-6579; DSN 821-6579

305th MI Battalion Courses

Website:http://huachuca-usaic.army.mil/SCHOOL/111MI/305th/305welcm.htm

Phone: (520) 533-7352, DSN 821-7352

Noncommissioned Officer Academy

Website:http://huachuca-usaic.army.mil/SCHOOL/ NCOA/atest.htm

Phone: (520) 533-4217, DSN 821-4217

309th MI Battalion Courses

Website: http://huachuca-usaic.army.mil/SCHOOL/ 111MI/309TH/Welcome.htm

Phone: (520) 533-6833, DSN 821-6833

PROPONENT NOTES

OCMI Website

The Office of the Chief, Military Intelligence (OCMI) website, http://huachuca-dcd.army.mil/ocmi/index.html, contains timely information on proponent issues ranging from enlisted career management field (CMF) overviews to warrant officer current and archived newsletters. We will update the website often, so please use it as a resource for the latest information on the Military Intelligence Corps.

Enlisted

MI will increase its participation in the Total Army Involvement in Recruiting (TAIR) program. The intent is to establish a framework from which Active Component (AC) MI battalions and brigades develop a habitual partnership with local area recruiting commands to increase the visibility of intelligence career fields with potential recruits. Each AC MI battalion has an opportunity to establish a partnership with its local area recruiting organizations.

We can provide these local recruiters with the personnel and resources necessary to inform potential new recruits on the exciting and diverse career fields available in MI. In late February, OCMI participated in an "Army Day" presentation at Bradshaw Mountain High School in Prescott, Arizona. The event provided information about the Army and specific MI career opportunities. Other participants included U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC); 2/6th Air Defense Battalion, Fort Bliss, Texas; and representatives from the Army National Guard.

Warrant Officer

The accession goals for MI warrant officers for fiscal year 2000 (FY00) are out. MI accession boards for MI will be in July, September, and January. During one of those boards, the Army will admit warrant officers to all military occupational specialties (MOSs) except 352G (Voice Intercept Technician). The March 1999 board selected all accessions for 352G. We have a continuing need for applicants in all MOSs—with specific needs in MOS 351B (Counterintelligence Technician) and 351EKP (Human Intelligence Collection Officer, Korean Language Qualified). See USAREC's new website at http://www.usarec.army.mil for detailed instructions and the number to be selected for each MOS. Application forms and a checklist of all required items are also available on the website.

Officer

Implementation of Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) XXI continues. In March 1999, the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) announced Career Field (CF) designations for Year Group (YG) 80 and will announce YG86 CF designations in late June. The YG89 board will meet in June 1999, and PERSCOM will announce the results in conjunction with the release of the majors' promotion list in early September. OPMS XXI is on track to accomplish its goal of balancing MI authorizations with inventory during FY03.

As part of OPMS XXI, the U.S. Army created Functional Area (FA) 34, Strategic Intelligence Officer. Organizations should complete recoding all positions formerly coded 35B to FA34 before May 1999. FA34 is among the top choices of MI officers selecting a functional area. Although part of the Information Operations CF, FA34 proponency will remain at Fort Huachuca.

Editor's Note: See Major Rick Hoehne's article on page 37 for information on the new Strategic Intelligence Officers Course. The first class runs from 23 May through 30 July 1999.

OCMI has developed an initiative to reduce the Branch-detail time commitment from 48 months to 36 months. Consequently, Branch-detail officers will arrive at an MI Officer Transition Course near the 42-month mark in their careers, about the same time their promotions to Captain occur. The goal of the initiative is to increase the inventory of MI captains by ten percent.

The Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, has directed a closer look at the Special Electronic Mission Aircraft (SEMA) career field. To accomplish this, OCMI will bring together SEMA representatives this quarter at Fort Huachuca to discuss the issues and explore potential solutions.

Force Design and Force Structure

In late February, the OCMI participated in the Intel XXI "Draft Plan of Enactment" (DPE) review. Attendees reviewed the tasks and subtasks linked to each element of the DTLOMS (doctrine, training, leaders, organizations, materiel, soldiers. They also drafted milestones and timelines for the DPE's subtasks and developed a plan that allows MI—upon Chief of Staff of the Army approval—to implement Intel XXI actions.

The OCMI began to review and coordinate with the Requirements Documentation Directorate, Fort

Leavenworth, Kansas, for the table of organization and equipment (TOE) cyclic review for the MI battalions in the airborne, air assault, and light infantry units. OCMI will complete the review by 27 May 1999, in time for the formal review board scheduled to convene in late July. This allow for Department of the Army approval and publishing in Consolidated TOE Update (CTU) 0400. We have begun tremendous exchange and work between the OCMI force structure section and the Force Development office in the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM). As INSCOM continues to convert tables of distribution and allowances (TDAs) units to TOE ones, OCMI and INSCOM are working closely to maintain the health of the MI Branch, as reflected in its force structure for both units at echelons corps and below.

Readers can contact OCMI via E-mail at ocmi@huachuca-emh1.army.mil or telephonically at (520) 533-1173 or DSN 821-1173.

TSM NOTES

by Colonel Jerry V. Proctor

This issue of ***MIPB*** focuses on the Reserve Component (RC), and I am proud to relay that the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS), the most mature Army Battle Command System (ABCS), is fielded to the RC. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) System Manager (TSM) ASAS office has on staff a full-time Reserve Major dedicated solely to working RC ASAS fielding, training, and requirements issues.

We also host an annual RC ASAS Users' Conference in December. This is but one venue in which we seek to provide the best MI automation support to the total MI force. The emerging Block II ASAS will greatly expand ASAS fielding to the RC; it will include the ASAS Remote Workstation (RWS) Lite, a Windows NT® version of the RWS that has slightly fewer capabilities but will be much easier to use and train. Many MI automation efforts focus on the RC user.

On 10 December 1998, the TSM ASAS hosted the first RC Users' Conference. During the conference, users from each of the enhanced separate brigades (eSBs) briefed both the positive aspects of ASAS and those areas needing improvement. Although the RC ASAS community is small, we had a very good turnout. Approximately 90 Army National Guard (ARNG) and United States Army Reserve (USAR) soldiers participated. Users from 13 of the 15 ARNG eSBs attended, as did representatives from each of the five regional Army Reserve Intelligence Support Centers (ARISCs). We will continue this positive exchange in the future.

As a result of the conference, we were able to uncover a number of Reserve-unique problems that need attention before we field the Block II systems. Our principal mission will be to solve ASAS training and maintenance support problems within the units. Major Anthony W. Stratton, our RC fielding and training officer, has begun coordination for this effort. With the limited amount of training time available to Reserve soldiers, we also want to take a hard look at innovative techniques to provide RC tailored ASAS sustainment training at unit level. There are a number of directions to go, but we need a training strategy allowing RC soldiers to train at home or at their units. This is a challenge that will pay many dividends for the RC and the Total Army.

The author thanks Major Tony Stratton for his input into this article.

Colonel Jerry Proctor is the TSM ASAS and the Deputy TSM is Mr. Michael Strack. Readers can E-mail them at proctorj1@huac huca-emh1.army.mil and strac km@huachuca-emh1.army.mil. You can reach them telephonically at (520) 533-3504/7 or DSN 821-3504/7.

Address Verification

Due to new postal regulations, we are updating our mailing list for ***MIPB***. The Post Office now requires building numbers, street addresses, and nine-digit zip codes. APO addresses should include unit, box number, and CMR number as appropriate. Other overseas or non- U.S. addresses should be complete, including postal and country codes and names. Please review and update your mailing label. If your address is not correct or is incomplete, please notify us by E-mail at martinezc@ huachuca-emh1.army.mil with subject heading "Address Update." Please include both your incorrect (copy it **exactly** from the label) and correct addresses. You can also contact us by telephone at commercial (520) 538-1015 or DSN 879-1015.

ASAS Master Analyst Program
Sly Fox Den ASI 1F Notes

by Sergeant First Class Kristine M. Sleighter

The mission of the U.S. Army Reserves is to complement the Active Component (AC). In the intelligence community, this ranges from an entire Reserve Component (RC) unit augmenting a major command to an individual working on temporary duty in such places as Bosnia, Kuwait, and Korea. In today's force projection Army, such a tasking could come at any time.

What level of All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) proficiency can you expect from an RC 96B (Intelligence Analyst) or 98C (Signals Intelligence Analyst) soldier? The goal for ASAS training programs is to facilitate mission training—not ASAS training. When Reservists augment the active force, the gaining command should not have to implement intense ASAS training to prepare for operations.

The RC faces two significant challenges regarding ASAS: personnel and training. Personnel assigned to a reserve organization tend to have longevity, providing unit stability. This obviously is beneficial to the organization. If the opposite were true, the unit could face resistance to learning or refreshing ASAS skills. Training issues for the RC include the normal uncertainties the AC faces. Once soldiers complete initial entry training, what is their proficiency level on ASAS? When a soldier states, *"I know ASAS,"* does that translate to total proficiency? What type of sustainment training is available? In the AC, we have a difficult time squeezing in ASAS training during an entire month. Imagine only having two days each month (plus an additional two weeks for annual training) to accomplish everything. Also, remember how perishable ASAS skills are. These skills are not the types that one never forgets once they are learned.

Part of the "1F" mission is to assist in facilitating ASAS support for the RC. We currently have one "Sly Fox" position, filled by Chief Warrant Officer Four Michael Cuneo, with the Southeastern Army Reserve Intelligence Support Center (ARISC) in Fort Gillem, Georgia. CW4 Cuneo—

- Conducts workshops (which he publishes on the INTELINK (Intelligence Link)).
- Offers individual readiness training (REDTRAIN) opportunities.
- Provides mission support to the Active force using full ASAS suites.
- Furnishes field assistance visits during exercises and Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations.

Their system connects to both Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) and Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET), attempting to facilitate the most realistic training possible. The other four ARISCs, each equipped with ASAS Remote Workstations (RWSs), are at Fort Dix, New Jersey (Northeast ARISC); Fort Sheridan, Illinois (Northcentral ARISC); Camp Bullis, Texas (Southwest ARISC); and Camp Parks, California (Western ARISC). The Northcentral ARISC has taken the lead in communications—the Achilles' heel in RWS field operations—to include increasing the normal tactical capacity. Camp Bullis is expanding their number of RWS workstations while Camp Parks is attempting innovative ideas such as holding a regional workshop in its facility. The dedication of each ARISC is to the integration and the training necessary to make ASAS an integral part of their intelligence mission.

The U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG) has 15 enhanced brigades, each with 2 RWSs. These RWSs form the core of automating the separate brigade analysis and control element (ACE). The current trend is that the RWS will interface with Warlord Notebooks and personal computers loaded with Terrabase or Windows Cartographic Analyst Tool Set (WINCATS) terrain packages. Although makeshift in concept, it has allowed automated interface between staff elements and between the brigade and subordinate battalions.

The Reserve Component is working to integrate ASAS training throughout the force. Part of Reserve units' ASAS training plan should include integration into the Active unit they are supporting. The "1F" in each ACE can identify the proficiency level required for each ASAS operator, and create a plan to facilitate the training. Active units knowing which reserve organizations are augmenting them should have a cooperative training strategy, which will facilitate minimum ASAS training at the gaining unit. Innov-

(Continued on page 52)

Sly Fox Den *(Continued from page 51)*

tive training strategies—such as reserve soldiers reporting to an ARISC for ASAS training while TDY enroute to the gaining command—would afford that gaining organization more time to conduct mission training versus ASAS training. REDTRAIN (Readiness Training) opportunities also provide each command with training options. With limited options and resources, ASAS sustainment training should be individually tailored (by soldier or unit), tightly focused (based on mission requirements), and coordinated between the Reserve and Active components. Command support is critical for innovative ASAS training, ultimately providing the total force with ASAS-proficient operators prepared to do the mission.

Special thanks to Chief Warrant Officer Four Michael A. Cuneo for input to this article. He is the 1F at the Southeastern ARISC.

Sergeant First Class Kris Sleighter is the Chief, ASAS Master Analyst Branch, in the Directorate of Continuous Learning. She has previously served as Chief, Intelligence Section, U.S. Army Europe Battlefield Coordination Element at Ramstein Airbase, Germany. She is a graduate of the ASAS Master Analyst Course and the Theater-level Collection Manager and Intelligence Analyst Course. She is in her third year studying for a Bachelor of Science degree in a Business/Information Systems Program. Readers can contact her via E-mail at sleighterk@huachuca-emh1.army.mil and by telephone at (520) 533-4652 or DSN 821-4652.

RESERVE COMPONENT

Overview of the MI Force

Overall:

	FY90	FY98	% Change
AC Military	40468	26259	-35.11%
Civilians	7552	5151	-31.79%
ARNG	4915	7089	44.23%
USAR	10776	6271	-41.81%
TOTAL:	63711	44770	-29.73%

	FY90	FY99	% Change
AC Military	40468	25998	-35.76%
Civilians	7552	5024	-33.47%
ARNG	4915	7327	49.07%
USAR	10776	6144	-42.98%
TOTAL:	63711	44493	-30.16%

By Component:



Key:
AC Active Component
ARNG U.S. Army National Guard
USAR U.S. Army Reserve

EDITOR'S NOTES

- In the April-June 1998 ***MIPB***, "Intelligence Planning in the Digital Division" on page 13, we mistakenly credited the photographs to the U.S. Army. We should have credited the photographs to A.A. Frame.
- In the January-March 1999 ***MIPB***, the titles of the articles on pages 21 and 40 were incorrect due to an error in the printing process. The titles should have read, "Ground Surveillance Operations in Bosnia" and "The Aerial Exploitation Battalion at NTC: Aerial Intelligence Defines the Battlefield " respectively.
- In the January-March 1999 ***MIPB*** on pages 6 and 35, we mistakenly expanded MASINT as "measurement" and "measurable signals intelligence." It should have read "measurement and signature intelligence."

PROFESSIONAL READER

Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War by Mark Bowden (NY: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999), 386 pages.

So you have never been in combat. Come to Mogadishu. Maybe you are the rear detachment company clerk who was called forward due to an injury. Join the "D-Boys" and Rangers on a quick raid gone wrong. Fast-rope into a crowded African city on a Sunday afternoon and smell, taste, hear, and touch the reality of true combat. Test your soul; what would you do if you were surrounded by thousands, only miles from safety in the heart of enemy territory, and there is a BLACK HAWK DOWN?

Mark Bowden has taken his award winning series of newspaper articles written for the ***Philadelphia Inquirer*** and turned them into a must-read classic for all military professionals. He took a modest assignment and overachieved; we are the beneficiaries. His detailed account of the Battle of the Black Sea (Mogadishu: 3 and 4 October 1993) should and will occupy the bookshelves of every military professional or would-be warrior.

This book is about a modern war involving many soldiers still on active duty. It is not about destroying tanks from 3,000 meters away, but is about close combat when the rules of engagement cease to have relevance and survival requires immediate instinctive responses. This book is a crystal ball on future urban warfare and a cautionary note for contentious peacekeeping operations.

The devil is in the details and the reader will not want for details. All of the gore, frustrations, disagreements, mistrusts, illusions, misconceptions, ramifications, difficulties, cowardice, and heroics are here for all to see. Certainly there is some hype and inaccuracy, but no interesting microscopic analysis can exist without such blemishes.

Seldom has such a small tactical operation had such far-reaching strategic consequences. U.S forces in Bosnia can attribute restrictive force-protection measures to this battle's legacy. Future leaders who do not assimilate the lessons of Mogadishu are in danger of repeating this tragic story.

I strongly recommend this book to all military professionals. Learn what Delta Sergeants Randy Shughart and Gary Gordon did to earn the only Medals of Honor awarded for actions during the past quarter-century. You will not want to put this book down once you start reading it.

Major Carl J. Bradshaw
Fort Drum, New York

Citizen Soldiers by Stephen E. Ambrose (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 512 pgs, $49.95.

Citizen Soldiers by Stephen E. Ambrose is clearly one of the best ever written on the most critical period of World War II: June 7, 1944 to May 8, 1945. The author takes the reader into the battles with the true heroes of the war—the ground soldiers and air crews.

Not only does this work deal with the allied forces, but through the masterful interviews with the participants, he gives insight into the minds of the German forces. He describes the everyday lives of the ground troops in such detail that the reader feels that they are there. From the terrifying bombardment of their foxholes to the liberation of a wine cellar, the experiences the soldiers share are electrifying.

The author's talent in tapping the memories of those who were there is evident throughout the book. At no time during **Citizen Soldiers** will the reader ever wonder where

the author is heading. The author masterfully planned and displayed the layout of the traumatic experiences of the contributors for the reading audience.

The author explores the successes and failures of the military leaders and their intense power struggles with enough detail to allow the thoughtful reader to feel the emotions present at the time. He also describes the successes and failures of the intelligence community, which at times led to disastrous results for the ground troops.

Finally, the author takes us into the Nazi prisoner of war camps, concentration camps, and the slave labor camps to illustrate in depth why the allied forces had to fight this war that nearly decimated an entire generation. This book will take the readers as close to actual combat as they care to venture. I highly recommend this excellent work to any student of military history and veterans of any armed conflict. If ever a book, dealing with such a horrible subject could be labeled as enjoyable reading, this one definitely is. This ability is a great credit to the author.

Mr. William F. Ivory
Fort Huachuca, Arizona

Diplomacy for the Next Century by Abba Eban, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998. 176 pages. $24.00).

Premier Abba Eban, Israel's premier diplomat, has tremendous experience to offer on the subject of international diplomacy. In **Diplomacy for the Next Century,** he emphasizes that leaders should focus on national interests rather than moral concerns when making policy. Of special interest to anyone working in intelligence, Eban makes penetrating observations on the pitfalls of strategic analysis. He notes that there are more unforeseen events in international relations than predicted occurrences. Although leaders may know the physical facts, governments tend to accept that an enemy's previous pattern of behavior will repeat itself and reject assessments that contradict their preconceived notions. This point accompanies Eban's discussion on the perils of analogy: an attempt to judge a present situation based on similarities to a previous one is fraught with dangers. Eban warns that the "*basic truth is that circumstances in which situations differ...may precisely be those that define their essential nature.*" For intelligence professionals, this point is worth remembering especially in light of the recent U.S. failure to foresee India's nuclear tests.

Diplomacy for the Next Century provides a brief history of diplomacy from the ancient Greek city-states to the present with a central theme of how a state's interest properly serves as its guide to foreign policy. Eban strongly rejects idealism as a guide and describes President Woodrow Wilson's efforts at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference as a prime example of what not to do. In a similar vein, he criticizes U.S. support for human rights, which he sees as often inconsistent. Eban notes how President Jimmy Carter, in his memoirs, defended his support of human rights but failed to mention his 1977 speech lauding the Shah of Iran and describing Iran as "*an island of stability.*"

In discussing the United Nations, Premier Eban is skeptical of the organization's ability to protect human rights since such an aim directly conflicts with the sovereignty of individual members. He also makes a cogent argument on the irrationality of severing diplomatic relations at the moment of conflict since it is at that time when relations are necessary. Eban points out that the severing of relations stems from the idea that diplomatic relations have a moral rather than a utilitarian significance.

Eban also addresses the role of the media—an area of intense concern in military operations today. Eban laments the lack of privacy for international negotiations and mentions that even Woodrow Wilson's call for "*open covenants*" was qualified to mean "open" only after agreements were complete. He makes it clear that secrecy is essential to resolving diplomatic disputes.

Diplomacy for the Next Century is well written, laced with cogent historical examples, and is also humorous. Although the sections on the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations tend to be partisan, Eban's book is worthwhile to read.

Lieutenant Colonel
Michael K. Connell
West Point, New York

The Lions of July: Prelude to War, 1914 by William Jannen, Jr. (Presidio Press, 1996)456 pages, $18.95.

Almost eighty-five years after the beginning of World War I, the fascination with its origins continues. One of the reasons we are intrigued by the beginning of this war is our search for lessons from the events that triggered it.

William Jannen, Jr., has done a great service for those who want to learn from the events of July 1914. **The Lions of July: Prelude to War, 1914** not only describes the sequence of events leading from Sarajevo that year in straight-forward manner, but does so in a way pointing to the lessons to be learned. The book is a day-by-day account of the events from 28 June 1914 to 12 August 1914, the day Austria-Hungary, as the last of the European belligerents, entered the war.

The Lions of July is an accident report. It catalogs the "number of separate and independent failures"

that led to the war. Those failures and, consequently the lessons to be learned, include a lack of understanding of the dynamics of the system in which one operates, the role of the individual in that system, and the pressures of public opinion, fear, and ignoring insight.

Failing to understand the system derives from not comprehending the the European alliance system as a whole. For example, Austria-Hungary assumed the conflict only concerned itself and Serbia. England and Russia assumed it was an issue for the Great Powers to resolve. England also assumed that a Russian general mobilization would not necessarily lead to military operations.

The fact that military planning in the years prior to 1914 was not grounded in the diplomatic goals and realities of the time also contributed to a faulty understanding of the European alliance system. The czar's ministers were confused about general mobilization. Anglo-French military talks in the pre-war years happened in a vacuum. The British general staff only planned to fight on the French left flank and France assumed the Royal Navy would defend its northern and western coasts. The planning assumptions of the Schlieffen Plan almost need not be mentioned. In all cases, the military left diplomats with no options and the diplomats did not know it.

Fear drove Russia and the other Great Powers to war. There was a fear of new technology (the czar, the kaiser, and the Emperor Franz Josef did not like to use the telephone). The European aristocracy watched the growth of mass participation in politics. More than any other fear, the Great Powers were afraid of their own decline. The leaders of the Great Powers saw war as the only way to arrest their decline although they knew war would mean the end of their world.

Through the words of those individual actors, Jannen has done an excellent job of depicting that fear and how it drove them to war. He does not challenge commonly held conclusions about the war's origins and that is not his intent. He does not wholly support some of his conjectures through the evidence; but they are minor ones. A timeline rather than a calendar at the appendix would have been as helpful as the list of participants at the beginning of the book.

The great value of **The Lions of July** lies in its clear description of the series of events that led to the most destructive war of its time. The result is the opportunity to draw better lessons that help us to understand today's world and possibly avoid similar mistakes in the next crisis.

LTC Arnold Geisler, Germany

Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia. by David Bercuson: (Toronto, Canada: McClelland and Stewart, Inc., 1997 263 pages, $26.95).

The Canadian Army is slowly recovering from one of the biggest peacetime scandals in its history. On March 16, 1993, members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group detained, tortured, and beat to death a sixteen-year-old Somali boy. In **Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia,** David Bercuson describes the events that led to the brutal murder of Shidane Abukar Arone and exposes wide-ranging incompetence at the highest levels of the Canadian Army. Bercuson claims that the problems in the Canadian Army ran much deeper than the actions of a few undisciplined, racist soldiers. The problems resulted from poor leadership at all levels and a lack of clear direction from senior officials.

According to Bercuson, discipline began to breakdown in the regiment during the mid 1980s. Incidents of violence, arson, and extremist activities soon became common occurrences. Company grade officers failed to support their noncommissioned officers, and small-unit leadership suffered. The absence of dedicated, competent junior noncommissioned officers directly contributed to the murder of Shidane Abukar Arone and mission failure in Somalia.

Bercuson acknowledges that not all the problems surrounding the regiment were internal. As the regiment was preparing for operations in Somalia, the senior military and political leadership was ambivalent in developing suitable rules of engagement. The unfortunate result was an ineffective predeployment training plan and failed to prepare soldiers for the difficult, ambiguous situations they would face in Somalia. Members of the regiment were confused over the rules of engagement; the confusion would only get worse.

Peace operations are inherently complicated, and soldiers must train differently for a peacekeeping operation than they would for a peace-enforcement operation. The Canadian Airborne Regiment found itself in Somalia without having any tactical training on the new revised rules of engagement.

Significant Incident is a welcomed case study of how *not* to prepare a unit for peace operations. Bercuson confirms that clear goals, lucid guidance, and realistic training are critical for mission success. More importantly, Bercuson demonstrates how competent, reliable leadership is essential for mission success.

Captain Stephen M. Grenier
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

How to Submit an Article to MIPB

Select a relevant topic of interest to the military intelligence community. For example, it could discuss current operations and exercises, equipment, TTP, or training. It could be historical, explain lessons learned, or it could be an essay-type thought-provoking piece. It could be a short "quick tip" on better use of equipment or personnel, or fast "work-arounds" for problems. Articles from the "hot spots" are always welcome. Seek to add to the professional knowledge of the MI Corps. Propose changes, describe a new theory, dispute an existing theory, explain how your unit has broken new ground, give helpful advice on a specific topic, or explain how a new piece of new technology will change the way we operate.

Write an outline to organize your work and include a working title and headings. Plan to write 1000-2500 words (about 2-4 pages single-spaced text with normal margins, not counting graphics) and include graphics that enhance understanding of your topic. Quick tips should be 300-800 words. Put the "bottom line up front" and write clear, concise introduction and conclusion paragraphs. Follow proper rules of grammar. Consult **DA Pamphlet 600-67**, **Effective Writing for Army Leaders**, or William A. McIntosh's **Guide to Effective Writing**.

In order to write a clearer, more forceful article, avoid several stylistic pitfalls.

- **Maintain the active voice as much as possible**. Write, "*The soldier performed the task*" rather than "*The task was performed by the soldier.*"
- **Make your point**. Avoid writing about internal organization administration. If your topic is a new piece of technology, tell the readers why it is important, how it works better, and how it will affect them. Avoid lengthy descriptions of who approved the new system, quotations from senior leaders describing the system, reports your organization filed regarding the system, etc.
- **Use the fewest words to state your points**. Write "*Leaders must emphasize training*" rather than "*It is imperative for MI professional leaders to refocus their attention to training issues.*"

Please send the article via E-mail to mipb@huachuca-emh1.army.mil with a courtesy copy to mcgoverne@huachuca-emh1.army.mil or mail it (with a soft copy on disk) to Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-CLM (MIPB), [FedEx/Priority Mail: Bldg 61730, Room 127], Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000. (Please do not use special document templates and do attach the graphics separately. We can accept articles in Microsoft Office 97®, Word 6.0™, Word Perfect 6.0a™, and ASCII and PowerPoint™ or Corel®.) Please include with your article:

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*U.S. Government Printing Office: 1999 — 781-027/64507

634th Military Intelligence Battalion

Oriental blue and silver gray (silver) are the traditional colors for the Military Intelligence Corps. Red denotes valor and zeal and alludes to the 34th Division—the "Red Bull" Division, which the 634th MI Battalion supports. The compass rose that points outward and the arrowheads pointing in reflect the unit's motto and underscore the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information. The compass also highlights the worldwide scope of the intelligence mission.

On 1 October 1995, the National Guard Bureau created seven new divisional military intelligence battalions. The purpose of these battalions is to provide tactical MI support to their U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG) Divisions. Since its creation in 1995, the 634th MI Battalion—located at Rosemount, Minnesota—has provided intelligence support to the 34th Infantry Division (ID), based in Minnesota, Iowa, Wisconsin, and North Dakota. It has fulfilled its combat intelligence, battlefield deception, ground-based communications intercept, tactical counterintelligence, interrogation of enemy prisoners of war, and ground surveillance support functions.

At this time, the 634th MI Battalion, like its sister battalions, is in a cadre status; it currently has only 85 positions. The Battalion will increase to 110 positions in 2000, and the battalion will eventually reach its full strength of around 430.

As part of the support it provides, the 634th MI Battalion has participated in five Warfighter exercises at the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. At the BCTP, it supported the 34th ID and assisted the 40th, 42d, 35th, and 38th IDs.

The 634th MI Battalion enjoys a reputation for being very successful at the Warfighter exercises and it was the first National Guard MI Battalion to employ the Analysis and Control Element concept successfully. The 634th MI Battalion is also involved in supporting real-world missions at the national level.

The other six new ARNG MI battalions are dispersed across the country. They are the 628th MI Battalion at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, supporting the 28th ID; the 635th MI Battalion at Kansas City, Missouri, supporting the 35th ID; the 638th MI Battalion at Indianapolis, Indiana, supporting the 38th ID; the 640th MI Battalion at Los Alamitos, California, supporting the 40th ID; the 642d MI Battalion at Troy, New York, supporting the 42d ID; and the 649th MI Battalion at Austin, Texas, supporting the 49th Armor Division. The 629th MI Battalion supports the 29th ID and is a full-size battalion.

Collect, Analyze, Disseminate!